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ABSTRACT 
 Anti-government protest movements have been increasingly significant in 
Russian politics. This thesis investigates why these movements have risen, as well as if 
and how they resonate with the broader segments of Russian society. It draws inferences 
based on scholarly research regarding the durability of these movements in the short and 
long terms based on social movement theory. Through the application of this theory, it is 
found that mobilization is the most determining characteristic in measuring the 
opposition’s potential durability. With the Russian government’s thus far successful 
campaign to suppress anti-government movements and mobilization numbers too 
minimal to generate a necessity for genuine and lasting change, hope for the resilience of 
the country’s opposition force is nominal. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
On December 4, 2011, what became known as the Snow Revolution broke out in 
response to the Russian legislative elections. These protests, which involved tens of 
thousands in opposition to the Russian government, were motivated by a then immense 
concern that the results of the elections had been corrupted. As New York Times journalist 
Ellen Barry wrote just days after the revolution began, “The demonstration marked what 
opposition leaders hope will be a watershed moment, ending years of quiet acceptance of 
the political consolidation Mr. Putin introduced.”1 Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president 
2000–2008 and 2012–present, instituted a soft-authoritarianism style of government in 
Russia, thus holding firm control over the Kremlin (Russia’s central government), law 
enforcement, and population. The 2011 protests marked the first major outbreak against 
Putin-influenced corruption, and the beginning of a larger social movement, which would 
act in opposition to Putin’s style of governance.  
Upon Putin’s reelection in 2012 and, thus, reestablishment of his presidential 
power, pro-government movements surfaced in response to these anti-government protests, 
intensifying the issue of contentious politics in Russia. Since Vladimir Putin’s rise to 
political office in 1999, and especially since the Snow Revolution, government-sanctioned 
movements have been increasingly significant in Russian street politics.. These pro-
government groups could foreshadow a solidification in the continued support for the style 
of government Putin has created. They would create a bulwark against those civil-society 
groups in Russia seeking a return to democracy and preservation of civil liberties. In the 
face of pro-government presence in civilian political activity, how durable are anti-
government movements likely to be? 
                                                 




This thesis will investigate why these movements have risen, as well as whether 
and how they resonate with the broader segments of Russian society. It will draw inferences 
based on scholarly research regarding the durability of these movements in the short and 
long terms. Specifically, it will evaluate literature that has both laid out the measurements 
of movement durability and applied said measurements to the Russian context.  
To understand the resilience of these movements, it is essential to analyze anti-
government movements through measurements laid out by social movement theory. This 
thesis will apply social movement theory broadly, investigating what characteristics it 
looks for and measures in determining durability of social movements. The primary factors 
social movement theory surveys in diagnosis of durability are a movement’s collective 
identity, claims for protest, acquirement of resources (financial and otherwise), 
organizational capacity, and mobilization of people. The more adeptly a movement can 
manage these characteristics, according to social movement theory, the more resilient that 
group should prove to be. The next step will be to apply said indicators to anti-government 
movements. This thesis will conclude with the findings on the durability of anti-
government movements within Russia, in accordance with the measurements found within 
social movement theory.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
Currently, the Russian people are ruled by a soft-authoritarianism style of 
government. The term “soft-authoritarianism,” in the context of Putin’s reign, is used in 
reference to the hybrid regime Putin has generated. Known as competitive 
authoritarianism, this kind of regime can be defined as a government that claims its 
authority under the label of “democracy,” but fails to meet the standards of democracy and 
instead violates them consistently.2 Rules of democracy violated by Putin’s regime include 
fair elections and freedom of protest, among others. In the 2011 legislative elections, for 
example, 17% of polling stations underwent ballot stuffing and 16% of the territorial 
                                                 
2 Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Elections Without Democracy: The Rise of Competitive 
Authoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy, Johns Hopkins University Press 13, no. 2 April 2002, 51–65, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/17196.  
3 
electoral commissions exhibited poor voting tabulation.3 Additionally, the Putin regime 
has muted many protests, both domestic and abroad. Many of those interested in 
participation in the Snow Revolution experienced forced police dispersion or detainment, 
nearly identical to the Putin-led repression experienced by protestors of the 2010 
Belarusian elections.4 These are just a few instances in the case of the Putin 
administration’s lack of compliance to democratic rules of governance.  
The mobilization of street protests, both for and against the Putin administration, 
has been sustained since the Snow Revolution incidence of 2011. In opposition to the 
government, some of the most notable protests have included the demonstration outside of 
Finland Station in St. Petersburg calling for Putin’s retirement, the protest in front of 
Ostankino television center in Moscow against government censorship of media (which 
included nearly 2,000 people), and the more recent 2017–2018 nationwide protests against 
the intense corruption within the Putin regime.5 These protests against and rallies for 
Putin’s government have mobilized of thousands of Russian citizens, generating reason for 
analysis questioning what they might lead to in terms of longevity or dissolution of Putin’s 
current style of government.  
Although the Putin administration’s progression toward competitive 
authoritarianism can be clearly traced, the question of the regime’s stability and longevity 
remains open. One way to assess the continuity of a regime such as Putin’s is to assess the 
protests opposing it, particularly with the end of a determination of the durability of these 
                                                 
3 Jim Nichol, Russia’s December 2011 Legislative Election: Outcome and Implications, CRS Report 
for Congress. December 13, 2011, 5. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42118.pdf; OSCE, International Election 
Observation, Russian Federation, State Duma Elections, 4 December 2011: Statement of Preliminary 
Findings and Conclusions, December 5, 2011. 
4 Nichol, Russia’s December 2011 Legislative Election; Tom Parfit, “Belarus Protests: More than 600 
Charged and Opposition Leaders in Jail,” Guardian, December 21 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2010/dec/21/600-charged-belarus-protests-lukashenko. 
5 Michael Schwirtz, “Russia’s Political Youths,” Demokratizatsiya 15, no. 1 (Winter 2007), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/21b9/a9bec27bf56332ac09536355b58b5dbe08c7.pdf; David Filipov, 





movements. The durability of anti-government movements holds potential impact on the 
future of Russian politics, government, and international decision making, as the people 
within these movements aim to spread influence over the Russian people and elites. This 
thesis will examine the resilience of these movements with the goal of understanding future 
prospects for Putin’s regime in the modern Russian political climate.  
Laura A. Henry, an expert on Russian civil society, argued in 2006 that, at that 
point, no social movements had yet mobilized the public or pressured the government to 
the point of permanent impact, and that Russian citizens have been reluctant to become 
involved in the movements.6 While this thesis does not study the success of movements 
but, rather, durability, Henry’s point should not be dismissed when considering 
mobilization in Russian social movements. This is especially true for the modern day 
Russian social movements, in particular those since the Snow Revolution of 2011. What is 
it, exactly, that social movement theory scholars look for in terms of durability of a social 
movement, and is it possible that durable movements have arisen in Russia in recent years? 
The next section addresses these questions.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review identifies the emergence of contentious politics and its 
significance in Putin’s Post-Soviet Russia, as well as how social movement theory can be 
applied in effort to understand the potential durability of the movements involved in 
Russian contentious politics (particularly, anti-government groups). It will begin with a 
discussion as to why these movements have surfaced, then move on to a presentation of 
social movement theory, reviewing its foundational concepts and goals as well as what the 
theory says regarding the cycles of protest in Russia. This section will also analyze the 
difference between issue-driven and ideology-driven social movements, and how these 
apply to the Russian context. It will present what authors have said with regard to the 
durability of these movements. This section will include what characteristics authors have 
distinguished as measurements of durability, especially with regard to Putin’s Russia.  
                                                 
6 Schwirtz, “Russia’s Political Youths.” 
5 
1. Why Have These Movements Surfaced? 
As Evegny Finkel and Yitzhak M. Brudny explain, a rise in the occurrence of 
contentious politics in Russia can be traced to the idea of spreading revolution, especially 
via the youth of the nation. In Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine over 2000–2004, youths led 
mass mobilization for anti-government movements, which pressed for governmental 
reform via mostly peaceful protest. These movements led to the overthrow of leadership in 
their countries.7 Those in the former Soviet Union became known as the color revolutions,  
While the color revolutions of the early 2000s, particularly the Orange Revolution 
in Ukraine, have been a source of inspiration for Russians in opposition to the corruption 
of the Putin regime, they have been of primary concern to Russian elites and authorities.8 
While Russian opposition movements have received advice and assistance from 
participants of the color revolutions, Putin’s regime has actively worked to combat and 
repress any anti-government groups. According to Graeme B. Robertson, “Vladimir 
Putin’s regime has built on the Soviet repertoire of channeling and inhibiting protest, 
creating a new system for licensing civil society and crafting ersatz social movements that 
rally support for the state.”9 Putin has formulated a contemporary style of repression by the 
state for the sake of generating support for his regime.10 social movement theory predicts 
that movements arise with the motivation to sustain radical action in the name of generating 
or maintaining some significant change.  
2. Social Movement Theory 
This section will describe the key arguments of social movement theory. It will then 
discuss the application of social movement theory to the Russian context. 
                                                 
7 Schwirtz, “Russia’s Political Youths.”  
8 Evgeny Finkel and Yitzhak M. Brudny, “Russia and the Color Revolutions,” Democratization 19, 
(June 2011): 15, DOI10.1080/13510347.2012.641297; Schwirtz, “Russia’s Political Youths,” 75.  
9 Graeme B. Robertson, “Managing Society: Protest, Civil Society, and Regime in Putin’s Russia.” 
Slavic Review 68, no. 3 (2009), 528, doi:10.1017/S0037677900019719. 
10 Finkel and Brudny, “Russia and the Color Revolutions,” 17. 
6 
a. What Is Social Movement Theory? 
Many experts agree that social movement theory contains at least three schools of 
thought: collective behavior and social movements research of the 1940s–1960s 
(emotionally focused), resource mobilization and political processes theories of the 1970s–
1980s (structurally/rationally focused), and the new social movement theorists of the 1990s 
(culturally focused).11 Each of these schools represents a generation of thinkers in social 
movement theory, to include the approaches those generations took to the analysis of the 
rise of social movements and the impact of those movements. The sharpest differences 
among these generations can be seen in their arguments as to the key reasons people and 
groups take to the streets.  
The generation concerned with collective behavior (1940s-1960s) within social 
movements research held that contentious politics were sparked most often by emotional 
drivers. This school of thought focused on the role of non-rational decision making of 
social movements, and how emotional thinking led to the rise of impactful social 
movements.12 According to experts, these types of movements lean primarily on emotional 
response to some external stimulus, and they do not tend to involve calculations that would 
typically be found in rational decision-making.13 One clear example of this is the Fascist 
movements of Europe during World War II (1939–1945), which arose via leadership’s 
emotional and non-rational turn to violence and imperialism as means to achieve great 
change following what they saw as the revolutionary World War I.14 This generation of 
social movement theory arose practically in direct response to WWII, and it recognized the 
then prominent will to act and to congregate based primarily on beliefs. It also relies heavily 
on the concept of Relative Deprivation Theory, as presented by Ted Gurr. Gurr argues that 
social movements are driven by frustration due to a sense of inequality or, as he labels it, 
                                                 
11 Paul Bate, Helen Bevan, and Glenn Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents: A Review of the 
Social Movements Literature: Implications for Large Scale Change in the NHS,” NHS Modernisation 





relative deprivation.15 According to John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, who wrote in 
response to Gurr’s work, “Shared grievances and generalized beliefs… about the cause and 
possible means of reducing grievances are important preconditions for the emergence of a 
social movement in a collectivity.”16 The main concept behind this theory is that 
discontented people find enough motivation in their grievances to press for a change. This, 
of course, would then lead to the spark of a social movement, especially if a collective 
group of people claimed the same inequality and desire for systematic transformation. 
Thus, this generation of social movement theory centered on the nonrational, emotional 
drivers behind movements, and placed special emphasis on the power of the mobilized, 
slighted collective to demand equality and change. 
The next generation of social movement theory, which arose around the 1970s-
1980s, responded to its predecessor by instead placing heavy emphasis on the rationality 
and structural opportunity of social movements.17 This school of thought held that 
individuals took action based on the potentiality of value or gain.18 Beginning, joining, and 
staying in social movements, according to this version of social movement theory, was 
heavily dependent upon rationally calculated risks versus gains, as opposed to emotions or 
belief systems. The idea of potential for gain extended to structural gain, which would have 
involved the opportunity for leadership, meaningful placement in a social or political 
hierarchy, and more. This generation also held that social movements were started and 
sustained when resource availability and resource mobilization were accessible.19 
Resources of this matter might include funding, means of travel, locations of meeting, 
education, and so forth. This emphasis on resources stems from their necessity in order for 
masses to gather, organize, staff, travel, advertise, incentivize, grow, and protest in a 
                                                 
15 T.R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972). 
16 John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial 
Theory,” American Journal of Sociology 92, no. 82 (May 1977): 1214, https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/
SOC924/Articles/McCarthyZald1977.pdf.  
17 Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents.” 
18 Ibid. 
19 McCarthy and  Zald, “Resource Mobilization and Social Movements.”  
8 
meaningful and “newsworthy” manner.20 As McCarthy and Zald wrote, “Only if survival 
is ensured can other goals be pursued.”21 Without the availability or mobilization of these 
resources, a movement would not be able to continue or expand, let alone survive. These 
are the reasons why and how social movement theorists of the 1970s-1980s predicted 
people would actively participate in a social movement, as well as what would have driven 
the movement toward a sustainable future. 
The third generation of social movement theorists then shifted back toward the 
concepts presented by those of the 1940s–1960s. These theorists, however, spun the 
concept of emotionally driven action to include, more broadly, culturally driven action. In 
addition to beliefs, this school of thought of the 1990s onward also began to take into 
consideration the individual’s identity and cultural symbols and meanings, further 
involving cultural historical context and framing processes.22 When considering cultural 
issues with regard to involvement in social movements, the theorist thereby takes into 
account how, “cultural conditions affect the decision to join, support and remain in a 
movement; social networks play a key role in recruiting, mobilizing and retaining 
participants, and communities of practice can be cultivated as important mechanisms for 
mobilization.”23 Within this school of thought, the human factors of decision making are 
more thoroughly accredited. Generally speaking, this generation takes into account the 
broader range of factors that should be considered when questioning what sparks and drives 
action in social movements.  
Literature after the spark of the third generation of social movement theory has 
attempted to incorporate the driving ideas behind all three of the aforementioned 
generations. This thesis will work off of a definition of contentious politics and social 
movement that best combine these schools of thought:  
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid., 1216. 
22 Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents.” 
23 Ibid. 
9 
Contentious politics occur when ordinary people, often in league with more 
influential citizens, join forces in confrontation with elites, authorities and 
opponents ... when backed by dense social networks and galvanized by 
culturally resonant, action-oriented symbols, contentious politics leads to 
sustained interaction with opponents. The result is the social movement.24 
Presented by S. Tarrow, this definition recognizes what D.A. Snow and other authors 
argue, which is that social movements generate their own identities, and that they do so 
with the goal to challenge or defend authority as the basis of their claim.25 This is best 
accomplished, according to Tarrow, when movements are pushed along by joint 
community action, are tied into social networks, and are connected broadly by culturally 
meaningful symbols.26 These are all necessary for the development of a social movement, 
and must therefore remain consistent in order for that movement to sustain itself. The 
literature reviewed agrees that social movements exist as a collective action to support or 
oppose some sort of authority (a person, a law, a government, etc.),27 Durability is 
therefore intertwined with collective action, dense social networks and resonant symbols. 
If a movement cannot rise without these three items, it surely would not continue to survive 
should they become absent. If these factors are not present, it should therefore be expected 
that the movements would not be durable.  
b. What Social Movement Theory Says about Protest in Russia 
With regard to Russia in particular, social movement theorists have been especially 
interested in the post-Soviet, post-communist opportunity for movements that press for 
political change.28 Henry argues that, when Russian organizations or movements form, 
                                                 
24 S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 2nd edition 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
25 Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents; D.A. Snow, “Framing Processes, 
Ideology and Discursive Fields,” in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, eds. Snow DA, Soule 
SA and Kriesi H (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).  
26 Tarrow, Power in Movement. 
27 Andrew Gl. Walder, “Political Sociology and Social Movements,” Annual Review of Sociology 35 
(August 2009), 393–412, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-070308-120035.  
28 Laura A. Henry, “Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia: Leadership, Organizational 
Diversity, and Innovation,” Post-Soviet Affairs (2006): 99–124, DOI: 10.2747/1060-586X.22.2.99. 
10 
they tend to cluster in niches according to resource availability and agenda compatibility, 
relying heavily on networking.29 She mentions that the range of political activism in Russia 
depends largely on the early organizational development as determined by movement 
leaders, who decide which other groups to affiliate with.30 Especially significant in the 
Russian context is the differentiation between existent group types: 1) grassroots 
organizations, which are fluid and informal and not officially registered, 2) professional 
organizations, which are similar to western nongovernmental organizations and are likely 
to be legally registered, and 3) government affiliates, which are highly institutionalized, 
legally registered with a paid staff, have formal hierarchies, and experience incentives and 
constraints for social activism.31 Limited resources; support by and influence of western 
NGOs; and a corrupt, dominant, activism-opposed state are instrumental in the social 
movements of Russia.32  The anti-government movements this thesis investigates fall in 
the first category. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This research will evaluate a proposition derived of the third generation of social 
movement research to determine the answer to the central research question: How durable 
are anti-government movements in Russia? This thesis will be based on the propositions 
set forward by S. Tarrow and Charles Tilly. Their work hypothesizes that a social 
movement will arise and be sustained when networks, collective identity/symbols, joint 
action, claims, resource availability, organization/leadership, and mobilization are present. 
The other two generations of social movement theory presented by earlier experts offer 
less comprehensive hypotheses with respect to what gives rise to social movements against 
the state.  




32 Henry, “Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia”; Ammon Cheskin and Luke March, 
“State–society relations in contemporary Russia: new forms of political and social contention,” East 
European Politics (2015): 261–273, DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2015.1063487. 
11 
The first generation follows that social movements are sparked and sustained 
through an experience of relative deprivation, which recognizes frustration as mobilizing 
agent against or in favor of the individual/group’s claim, depending on what the deprivation 
is in relation to (i.e., individual resources, opportunity, treatment, etc.). This generation 
hypothesized that people will start and continue to protest based on some feeling of 
inequality. Deprivation leads to frustration, frustrated grievances lead to movements, 
which leads to the hypothesis that irrational frustration of relative deprivation is 
instrumental to social movements. The central limitation of this approach is that it never 
makes explicit what objective conditions lead to perceptions of deprivation, and therefore 
collective action.33 
The second generation focused on the ability to master resources that allow proper 
seizing of opportunity to gather and protest. As Gurney and Tierney note,  
attempts to link the emergence and growth of movements to widespread 
feelings of deprivation… [gave] way to analyses which emphasize the 
contribution of social solidarity to movement mobilization (Tilly, 1978; 
Traugott 1978) and the ways movements function as organizations, 
recruiting members and mobilizing other resources to achieve collective 
ends.34  
The central proposition derived from this research is that availability of resources 
and resource mobilization are necessary in order to make collective protests happen. Pro-
government groups have resource support from the state, which allows their sustenance. 
This thesis will investigate the resource opportunity and mobilization that anti-government 
groups face.  
The third generation encompasses the two earlier schools of thought, taking a 
rational approach to emotional drive and resources, claiming that waves of protest rise and 
fall in response to windows of political opportunity. Henry’s work on post-Soviet 
                                                 
33 Joan Neff Gurney and Kathleen J. Tierney. “Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A 
Critical Look at Twenty Years of Theory and Research,” The Sociological Quarterly 23, no. 1 (1982): 33–
47, http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/4106351.  
34 Ibid., 34. 
12 
movements within this school.35 This generation argues that more is needed for civic 
mobilization than just frustration or resources. Tilly and Tarrow’s work, in particular, 
argues that movements are sustainable because of the following requirements: networks, 
claims, organizational capacity, mobilizational capacity, and resources.36 This third 
generation of social movement theory expects social movements to be durable as long as 
they have stability and consistency of these characteristics. This thesis, therefore, will 
evaluate the hypothesis presented by Tarrow and Tilly as the requirements for 
sustainability of social movements.  
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis seeks to examine the durability of Russian social movements through 
application of the indicators set forth by social movement theory discussed above. Because 
this thesis is concerned with the durability of social movements, it is imperative to analyze 
the activity within Russia’s contentious politics as an indicator of the potentiality 
surrounding social movements. To establish whether anti-government social movements 
in Russia are durable or not, the thesis must first examine the extent of contentious politics 
directed against the government. The main indicator of contentious politics this thesis uses 
are street demonstrations, as they signify that people have mobilized to generate an active 
and collective voice against specific acts, ideologies, laws, or people.  
1. Temporal Scope of Research 
All of the research will be conducted with a temporal scope covering the late 
Soviet-period to the present day, with an emphasis on the Putin era that began in late 1999. 
To gather a sense of how deeply Putin’s regime is engraved within modern day Russian 
society, this thesis will observe groups in opposition to the government. Movements will 
qualify as anti-government, on the other hand, if they protest against the Putin regime, or 
experience any political silencing by the police (such as Oborona and Youth Yabloko). 
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The groups selected vary in their success, enabling better evaluation of both the tenets of 
social movement theory and factors affecting movement durability in Russia. 
2. Measurements of Durability 
When considering the use of social movement theory in terms of this project, it is 
important to note that the theorists most often do not utilize it to determine durability of 
social movements. These authors and their works do prove helpful to this thesis, however, 
because they can still speak to the question of durability through the ways they analyze 
social movements. Analysis set forth by these authors has been consistent in the 
measurements of certain characteristics of social movements, and will therefore provide 
the framework for measurement of durability for the purpose of this research.  
Social movement characteristics that will be analyzed to determine durability of the 
movements in Russia are the following: collective identity (to include meaningful cultural 
symbols, joint action, and agenda compatibility, which also plays into networking) and 
claims, resources (availability and consistency thereof), clarity of organization and 
membership (to include leadership), and mobilization (to include networking).37 
According to the literature, collective identity can be indicated by joint action of a 
community or committed group under one common idea or claim, which also includes the 
networking that group has established for its community of support.38 Analysis of 
collective identity in social movement theory considers meaningful cultural symbols, with 
particular attention to whether there are large, overarching symbols that can bring 
generations or masses together to stand up to the regime. Claims in social movment theory 
are measured in terms of the level of radical change aspired to by the movements, and 
whether that claim is likely to lead to change.39 Resources available are analyzing whether 
groups have sufficient resources for sustainability, as well as where those resources come 
from (i.e., the Russian state, western nongovernmental organizations, etc.), as resource 
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scarcity alone can lead to the deterioration of a movement.40 Organization in social 
movement theory is indicated by patterns of clear development, leadership, and ability to 
generate structure within the movement and/or protest among leaders, members, etc.41 
Finally, social movement theory measures movements’ civic mobilization by noting 
numbers involved for one shared goal (the collective identity/claim), whether those 
numbers are of group membership from start to present day, of participants in individual 
protests, and so forth.42 The measurement of mobilization also takes into account the 
demographics of civic mobilization.43 These are the elements that this research will take 
into consideration in order to assess the potential for durability of social movements in 
Russia.  
In the this thesis then the Applied metrics of durability, as presented in accordance 
with social movement theory, will include collective identity (framing and claims), 
organization, group resources, and civic mobilization.44 Evidence of collective identity 
will be “the identification and articulation of common ground among participants.”45 
Organization will be measured based on evidence of self-organization with “central 
coordinating and resourcing,” which could extend to “a) formal organization, b) 
organization of collective action, or c) social movements as connecting structures or 
networks.”46 This thesis will measure claims in terms of whether those involved are 
involved voluntarily and spontaneously and under common identity, as opposed to via 
                                                 
40 Ibid; Henry, “Shaping Social Activism in Post-Soviet Russia.” 
41 Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents”; Henry, “Shaping Social Activism in 
Post-Soviet Russia.” 
42 Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents.” 
43 Schwirtz, “Russia’s Political Youths.”   
44 Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change Agents.” 
45 Croteau D. and Hicks L. “Coalition Framing and the Challenge of a Consonant Frame Pyramid: The 
Case of a Collaborative Response to Homelessness,” Social Problems, 50 (2) 2003, 257. 
46 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 123–124; Bate, Bevan, and Robert, “Towards a Million Change 
Agents.” 
15 
programmed means.47 Group resources observed will include financial and locational 
aspects. And civic mobilization will be measured in terms of numbers consistently involved 
with the movement. Through these means, analysis of the prevalence and durability of 
these groups will speak to the probable longevity (or lack thereof) of Putin’s style of 
authoritarianism. 
3. Sources of Data 
The data source for the purpose of this analysis will be primarily qualitative 
examination of existing literature set forth by social movement theory and experts on 
Russia. Additional research will include available quantitative data on population 
involvement in these groups to determine scale of mobilization, survey data on satisfaction 
with one’s life, government and leadership. Also utilized will be budgets and annual reports 
for the movement forces that covers details such as membership dues, donations, and 
financial support (both internal and external), if available in English. This thesis will 
furthermore draw from primary sources in order to directly quote details such as mission 
statements, thus providing measurement of group identities, claims, and goals. News 
articles will also be used in this research to provide some of the most recent information 
available covering protests and regional political climate within Russia. These non-western 
sources will furthermore present insight with different biases and agendas than western 
literature, thus generating a better-rounded basis of research. The answers given by this 
collective research will be instrumental in determination of the long-term potential for 
resilience for and, therefore, impact of Russian anti-government social movements on 
Russian politics. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
Chapter I has introduced the topic and research questions and mapping out the 
general layout of the rest of thesis. Chapters II–V will introduce the contemporary history 
of contentious politics in Russia, and will review some of the most significant anti-
government protests during four periods. They will analyze these protests and their 
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significance in Russian politics, to include the state’s response of direct intervention in 
contentious politics and in civil society. Chapter II covers the late Soviet and Yeltsin period 
of 1987–1999. Chapter III examines the first Putin period prior to the Snow Rovlution, 
1999–2009. Chapter IV covers the contentious politics of the Snow Revolution (2011–
2013). Chapter V will describe the most recent events in Russian contentious politics that 
followed the Snow Revolution until the present day. Chapter VI examines trends in 
propensity for the average Russian citizen to protest over time, along with shifts in 
government approval ratings. Chapter VII will examine three Russian anti-government 
movements, Oborona, the New Decembrists, and Alexei Navalny’s movement, to provide 
more detailed analysis of the characteristics that social movement theorists have set as 
resilience-determining factors. It will look at the groups’ collective identities, claims, 
resources (what is needed, how they are supplied/who from, how consistently they receive 
support, etc.), organization style and membership. It will pay close attention to any 
prerequisites or qualifications necessary for acceptance in those groups, recruiting into the 
groups, as well as requirements or expectations to remain a member, and mobilization 
capabilities and success. This thesis will then finish with an encompassing conclusion 
regarding the resilience of opposition movements and implications for the stability of 
Putin’s competitive authoritarianism.  
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II. RUSSIAN CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN THE LATE SOVIET 
AND YELTSIN ERA, 1985–1999 
A. BACKGROUND 
The coming chapters are dedicated to the review of the recent history and rise of 
contentious politics in Russia. Contentious politics, as it is outlined in Chapter I, refers to 
combined citizen confrontation of elites or opponents, and is the backbone of the social 
movement.48 As this thesis is concerned with the durability of social movements. 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the activity within Russia’s contentious politics as an 
indicator of the existence and durability of Russian social movements. Street 
demonstrations are the main indicator of contentious politics this thesis uses, as they signify 
that people have mobilized to generate an active and collective voice against the 
government. For historic background, contentious politics of the late Soviet era and early 
post-Soviet will be briefly reviewed before the remainder of this chapter examines the 
Yeltin years.  
B. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION DURING THE LATE SOVIET PERIOD 
The overall political activity of citizens in the pre-Gorbachev Soviet era was 
controlled and regulated by the government.49 All social organizations not in line with the 
government agenda were heavily directed in an effort to create, “Good communist 
citizens.”50 Not only was general political organization and participation controlled by 
restrictive laws on protests, group sizing, group funding, etc., but such laws were also 
formulated to generate consequences for such autonomous activity. This was true to the 
point that activists “feared the effects that mass participation would have on them and their 
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ability to access political elites,”51 and, in avoiding the negative effects of participation in 
autonomous politics, activists, “subordinated themselves to the state in exchange for access 
to the political elite. As a result, these actors were considered as part of the state apparatus 
and not separate from it.”52 Thus, the development of truly independent demonstrations 
and social movement groups was difficult and infrequent. Still, grass-roots social 
movements existed, but fell victim to the restrictions of the state.53 In accordance with the 
social movement theorists’ outlined requirements for durability in Chapter I, these groups 
relied heavily on networking (often with family members and close personal contacts) for 
resources and sustenance. Vertical interaction and mobility of these movements was 
greatly limited, however, because of the state’s substantial level of control over citizen 
political activity.54  
During the perestroika period under Mikhail Gorbachev, beginning in 1985, 
liberalization allowed these groups to exist more freely. However, many existed illegally, 
as they “lacked political and legal authorization.”55 It was at this time that social 
movements (often illegal, unofficial, non-institutional actors within contentious politics) 
became more commonplace.56 The shift in social movement activity after Gorbachev’s 
attainment of power is visualized in Figure 1, beginning in 1987 with the explosion of 
informal groups (neformalni).57  
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The upper graph depicts the change in number of protest demonstrations in the former 
USSR, 1987–1992, while the lower graph shows number of participants in protest 
demonstrations in the former USSR during the same years.  
Figure 1. Mobilization Waves in the Former Soviet Union, 
1987–199258  
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In these graphs, Mark R. Beissinger presents his research on the number of protest 
demonstrations and number of participants in protest demonstrations in the former Soviet 
Union from 1987–1992.59 Although Beissinger’s research is mainly concerned with the 
occurrence of violent demonstrations, his information reveals an overall rise in the number 
of protest demonstrations, and an initial rise in participation numbers that then fall back 
dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even the frequency of demonstrations 
fell back down to near zero not long after the rise of an independent Russia.  
C. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION IN YELTSIN’S RUSSIA  
With the fall of the USSR in 1991 came hope for the rise of a democratic Russian 
Federation. In post-communist Europe, the early promise of active social movements and 
individuals within society generated a positive outlook regarding Russia and its 
surrounding post-communist states.60 This was especially the case considering the 
unavoidable connections between social movements and the disintegration or fall of 
communism, as could be seen in the rise of the Solidarity movement in 1980s Poland, the 
environmental protests of the Danube Circle in Hungary from 1984 to 1989, and various 
demonstrations in Germany and Czechoslovakia, all of which worked to contest 
communist regime legitimacy in their respective countries (and with regard to their 
individual issues) prior to the fall of communist regimes in 1989 and dissolution of the 
USSR in 1991.61 As Petr Kopecky highlighted, civic political activity is not necessarily 
the cause of the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe; however, it “did 
contribute to the demise of communism and certainly played an important role in the 
various transition scenarios that unfolded throughout [Eastern Europe].”62 The 
contribution of the citizen in contentious politics and social movements within post-
communist Europe certainly helped to relieve symptoms of authoritarianism in the late 20th 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ljubownikow, Crotty, and Rogers, “The State and Civil Society in Post-Soviet Russia,” 157.  
61 Petr Kopecky, Uncivil Society? Contentious Politics in Post-Communist Europe (Extremism and 
Democracy), ed. Cas Mudde (Routledge, 2003).  
62 Ibid.   
21 
century. As Figure 1 reveals, however, the Russian Federation did not necessarily become 
independent in 1992 alongside widespread demonstrations of contentious politics.  
What is evident about the case of early post-communist Russia is that the 
government’s approach to social movements and a politically active civilian population 
changed only slightly with Boris Yeltsin, then drastically with Putin. As author Sarah L. 
Henderson noted, while the Yeltsin administration did not actively encourage contentious 
politics and social movements, the administration allowed some room for growth among 
social movements in that it did not pass legislation to make involvement in them difficult 
or disincentivized.63 However, Yeltsin also did not generate state-provided resources to 
such movements. Foreign people and other entities filled resource gaps for independent 
movements, while Yeltsin simply avoided initiation of state involvement.64 Donations to 
and participation in contentious politics both ran scant, though, with the immensely poor 
economic condition of Russia in the 1990s due to the shock-therapy economic reforms: 
“Most citizens lacked the time, the money, and the inclination to devote to organizations, 
either as workers, volunteers, or donors.”65 These essential resources ran thin at the time 
of Yeltsin’s presidency. Lack of social involvement is especially notable considering how 
little trust the Russian people had in government institutions: “50 to 68 percent of 
respondents in May 1996 withheld their trust from… the government, the president, the 
Federation Council, the State Duma, regional leaders, the courts, the police, and the 
prosecutor’s office.”66 This distrust, which may have been inherited from the Soviet 
regime, continued after a violent mass-participation anti-state protest in 1993 against 
Yeltsin’s ban of the Congress, Supreme Soviet, the Russian Communist Party, and various 
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opposition groups and unions.67 After intense backlash (and accusations of 
totalitarianism), Yeltsin brought the crisis to a halt only through with military force.  
While Russian civil society remained weak, social movements did emerge in this 
period. One civic group that gained prominence in the 1990s, and still exists today, is the 
Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (CSM). CSM formed in 1989, but re-surfaced 
most prominently in 1995 after Russia’s first war in Chechnya over the latter’s 
independence in 1994.68 The movement’s goal was to stop mistreatment of soldiers, end 
the war, and bring sons home to their mothers—especially those that were still school-
aged.69 Participants in this movement mobilized consistently throughout 1995–1997 via 
marches, vigils, and even conducting protests in warzones.70 Such persistent actions 
resulted in the early release of thousands of soldiers. After a petition in May of 1995 to 
bring soldiers home early in exchange for domestic civilian service, CSM settled into a role 
of educating Russian society and supporting groups with similar ideologies.71 Once the 
initial goals of CSM were fulfilled, the movement evolved its mission and continued 
activity within Russian society with an expansive mission of “creating a world without war 
and violence… Formation of civil society and the rule of law… Establishment of civilian 
control over the actions of state and local authorities… and formation of an active 
citizenship among citizens of the Russian Federation.”72 This movement managed to 
accomplish its initial goal, and to then evolve its mission in such a way that maintained its 
relevance within Russian society.  
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D. CONCLUSION 
At this point in Russia’s history, there was opportunity for social movements and 
contentious politics like CSM to develop and expand. CSM was one issue-focused 
movement that took advantage of this opportunity. Others, though, failed to gather any 
momentum and instead remained stagnant or failed to remain at all.73   
The information presented in Chapter III will review the general continuation of 
political passivity brought about by the Putin era.  
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III. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS IN THE PUTIN ERA, 1999–2010 
This chapter will review the activity and evolution of contentious politics in Russia, 
beginning with the rise of the Putin regime in 1999 and ending around 2010 just before the 
Snow Revolution, to include government response to the demonstrations. Governmental 
response will include policy and legislative changes as well as government interaction with 
contentious politics. An evaluation of such material reveals indicators of the state of 
democracy—such as freedom of association, freedom of speech, and toleration of dissent—
under the “soft” authoritarian government that Putin has generated. In the analysis, this 
chapter will also introduce the use of public opinion polls as a tool to gauge the political 
atmosphere in relation to the opinion of the Russian people. 
With the transition to Putin’s regime in 1999, the state developed a more watchful 
eye over the activities within contentious politics and social movements.74 The 
government began funding groups that mobilized under issues that aligned with Putin’s 
agenda.75 State intervention within contentious politics created a barrier to protests on the 
anti-government side, and inauthenticity on the pro-government side.76 This chapter will 
aim to reveal the significance and impact of these events on the development of Russia’s 
post-communist political landscape. In some cases, these events have led the state of Russia 
to respond directly with intervention in and control over contentious politics.  
At the start of the Putin regime, civic activism in Russia was considerably weak, 
although it had potential.77 After some time in power, Putin’s regime diminished a great 
deal of the opposition and promoted movements that acted in its favor.78 With the shift to 
Putin’s Russia, activists faced difficulty in transitioning smoothly from Yeltsin’s laissez-
                                                 






faire approach to Putin’s controlling manner regarding contentious politics. Much like in 
the 1990s, mobilization occurred not with long-term goals for great reform; rather, people 
engaged in issue-specific demonstrations. The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers mobilized 
a year-long series of protests against the third iteration of the Chechnyan War, started in 
Putin’s first year of power in 1999.79 The Putin regime viewed such demonstrations as 
threats to the stability of the state. The Putin administration established a “vigilant state,” 
maintaining a hand in and an acute sense of the status of contentious politics and social 
movements.80 It involved itself directly with groups that supported Putin’s ideologies and 
nationwide agenda through funding and support. The government had a vested stake in the 
mobilization capabilities of these groups and, thus, reason to come down harder via policy 
on anti-government demonstrations and movements. The Putin regime’s involvement 
within Russian contentious politics has generated inauthentic demonstration turnout, 
unequal access to resources, and a somewhat forced appearance of the population’s 
government approval via falsified rally numbers, all of which will be discussed in the 
analysis to follow. This has furthered the apathy of the Russian public and has restricted 
mobilization within contentious politics. 
Putin’s vigilant approach came partly in response to the influence the West had in 
supporting Russian civic political activity, serving both as a role model of democracy, as 
well as a large source of funding in the early post-Soviet period.81 This vigilance on the 
side of the regime complicated regular public political activity. Some of the most 
significant barriers are laid out clearly by author Samuel A. Greene, who says that the Putin 
regime’s attack on contentious politics and social movements included, “pressure on 
domestic and international sources of funding; legal changes to allow the state to rein in 
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[civic political activity];… and the curtailing of independent broadcasting.”82 Lack of 
funding prevented organizations and movements from maintaining and expanding 
operations, legalized state involvement in street politics, tainted the very concept of street 
politics as an outlet for the citizen’s voice, and control over media blocked the public eyes 
and ears from the entire truth of the political state of Russia. This contributed to a lack of 
activity among the civic political population, as many were demoralized, apathetic, or 
doubtful their participation would leave an impact. One June 2001 public opinion poll 
showed that, at that time, the army was the most trusted institution, 60%. Only 60% of 
respondents trusted the courts and 56% of the population believed the executive branch 
was the most corrupt institution. Just 14% of Russians in 2001 thought of their nation as a 
democracy; and 60% did not believe their votes would make a political difference.83  Still, 
only 5% of Russians were active in public organizations and 73% said they did not want 
to participate in them.84 With the start of the Putin regime, trust was low, civic morale was 
low, and civic involvement had potential, but little popular enthusiasm.  
The Russian state recognized the political atmosphere and initially moved to appear 
sympathetic to such apathy and hesitations.85 In 2001, the potential for a politically active 
civic population in Russia appeared hopeful. This was especially true after November 21–
22, when President Putin convened a Civic Forum involving several government officials, 
and multiple hundreds of participants in civil society and contentious politics.86 This forum 
met to discuss the social problems within Russia, with the overarching aim to strengthen 
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the state as a whole.87 According to author Marcia A Weigle, the government officials 
claimed, “An effective democratic state requires a strong, well-organized, and independent 
society.”88 For the state to stabilize and strengthen, it claimed that it needed the 
involvement of those it governed. However, the state encouraged civic involvement only 
in exchange for increased involvement of the state: “What was expected from social 
organizations engaged in voluntary activism was to sacrifice their independence in order 
to gain institutionalized consultation of their interests and a share of benefits allocated by 
the state.”89 While this was initially shot down by activists, the regime’s efforts to exercise 
greater vigilance over interactions between the contentious politics and the state did not 
waiver.90 
Following the Civic Forum, activity within Russian contentious politics was scant 
until 2004, when demonstrations over a proposed change to the social welfare system took 
place.91 With the abrupt switch to privatization beginning in the 1990s, the social welfare 
system began to distribute nonmonetary benefits to very specific groups (pensioners, 
disabled, military, etc.).92 The number of beneficiary groups grew, however, eventually to 
include nearly half of the Russian population by the time Putin rose to power.93 The new 
law, which would replace nonmonetary benefits with monetary, passed in January of 2005 
and sparked protests across the nation through March. At the time, Mischa Gabowitsch 
wrote, “Most protesters were older citizens, while younger people were too taken up by 
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their professional life in Russia’s new no-nonsense capitalist economy.”94  The efforts of 
the 2005 welfare protests, though, inspired a wave of protests among other various groups 
of people. One of these groups was students. After the government moved to exchange 
social benefits for monetary ones, tuition fees became mandatory for students.95 According 
to RFE/RL, in protest against this change, “Aleksandr Korsunov, a 23-year-old economics 
graduate, founded an independent Internet-based opposition movement called ‘Say No.’”96 
Say No provided information otherwise uncovered by government-controlled news sources 
and encouraged the youth population to defend their rights.97 Although the groups and 
demonstrations still surfaced on an issue-to-issue basis, more groups began to find their 
voices. 
It was around this time, 2005, that the government responded to civic political 
activity with a new prominent movement: Nashi.98 A massive revolution arose in Ukraine 
in 2004, called the Orange Revolution. The Orange Revolution, began by student activists, 
demanded an overthrow of the Ukrainian regime in favor of fair elections. Recognizing 
that this housed the potential to inspire a similar revolution in Russia, the regime mobilized 
Nashi as an anti-opposition youth force with ample resources and media coverage.99 Nashi 
mobilized around 50,000 people in May of 2005, who marched “to symbolize the young 
generation taking on from Russia’s war veterans the task of maintaining the country’s 
independence.”100 Such demonstrations continued sporadically over several years. In 
2005, they presented a public image that Russian youth supported the regime in a time 
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when popular trust in it was low and activity in contentious politics was increasing. These 
rallies also provided responses to groups such as CSM and student activists.101  
Traces of the opposition continued. Within the first half of 2006, Russia’s 
contentious politics scene began to attract a broader set of people. In March, around 
125,000 protestors took to the streets nationwide to speak out against a spike of nearly 40% 
in utility prices.102 While pensioners and older citizens were still among those most 
severely impacted by this issue, waves of protests mobilized students, teachers, private 
residents; in other words, they mobilized the general citizen.103 Many grassroots 
movements came out at this time, including under the leadership of people like Clarine 
Clement, director of the Institute for Collective Action in Moscow, Aleksander Korsunov, 
founder of Say No, and Vyacheslav Lysakov, coordinator of Freedom of Choice, a 
motorists’ lobby group. Their similar achievements can be summarized with the following 
statement made by Lysakov:  
In nine months, we have achieved quite a lot. We have attracted the attention 
of society, of the power vertical, of the media. We have raised questions 
that concern many millions of people. The effect is not so much in the 
concrete results that we have achieved, as in the fact that we have forced 
people to display their civic activity, believe in their strength, and 
understand that some things depend on them.104 
Organizers of such movements of this time in Putin’s regime recognized the need for 
Russians to feel that their voices, if heard, could make a difference. While street politics 
did not increase overall in the 2000s, it was important that such movements prevented its 
complete dissolution. 
Shortly after the pensioner protests began the series of scattered marches, each 
known as a “Dissenter’s March,” with the first in December of 2006 and the last in 2008. 
The marches operated under the banner that Putin had developed an authoritarian state, and 
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they called for his resignation.105 Nearly all of the protests were banned. The government 
issued warnings not to participate in these demonstrations that were labeled mass riots of 
extremism, and hundreds of participants were beaten and/or detained.106 Still, people 
showed up, including the extreme nationalist National Bolshevik Party and the pro-
democracy United Civil Front, among others. Meanwhile, according to Atwal and Bacon, 
Nashi, “Combined efforts with the youth wing of Putin’s party United Russia, Young 
Guard, to counter the series of opposition ‘Dissenters’ Marches’ in 2007 [and] was entitled 
‘Russia for the Russians.”107 Where there was an opposition protest, a pro-Putin Nashi 
rally would follow. And, while the Russian media covered select portions of the Dissenter’s 
March (and specifically avoided coverage of police violations of civil and human rights), 
it provided ample broadcasting of the Nashi demonstrations, exemplifying the uneven and 
artificial playing field generated by the Putin regime.108  
June of 2009 presented some concern to Russian civilians regarding their 
relationship with the state.109 According to journalist Luke Harding, “Over the past decade 
ordinary Russians have been content to put up with less freedom in return for greater 
prosperity. Now, however, the social contract of the Putin era is unravelling, and 
disgruntled Russians are taking to the streets, rediscovering their taste for protest.”110 
Grassroots protests sparked in June of 2009, in the midst of economic crisis, when the 
government passed a new law on imports that limited factories’ finances to the point of 
massive job losses and unpaid wages.111 The protests were physical evidence of the 
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nationwide unrest caused by this law. Still, the protests resulted in police brutality and 
detainments.112 
Soon after the Dissenters’ Marches and the June 2009 protests, the opposition 
moved to transform the bans and police brutality issues from the Dissenters’ Marches into 
opportunity for political change. In 2009, numerous protests formed to raise awareness for 
freedom of assembly and the violations thereof.  
From July 2009 Eduard Limonov, the founder of the National Bolshevik 
Party, organized civic protests in defense of the right of the freedom of 
assembly on the final day of months with 31 days, to defend Article 31 of 
the constitution guaranteeing citizens of the Russian Federation the right to 
assemble peacefully. The protests were joined by leading human rights 
organizations, including the Moscow Helsinki Group and Memorial.113  
Although these demonstrations resulted in no noteworthy changes, it is important to note 
the horizontal networking among groups, as well as continued (though sporadic) efforts to 
call for better treatment of civil and human rights from the government.  
In the Putin era, although there was potential for growth at this time, Russians 
maintained a generally apathetic view toward contentious politics. This came largely as a 
result of Putin’s particularly vigilant watch. This period gave rise to state response against 
contentious politics in various forms, thus further repressing those who desired to 
participate. This was true throughout the entire decade, although the last half saw a slight 
increase in opposition activity from civilians. 
The coming chapter will analyze the relationship between this rising concern for 
democratic principles in Russia and a movement of people willing to mobilize for such 
concerns surrounding the 2011 parliamentary elections. 
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IV. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS DURING THE SNOW 
REVOLUTION, 2011–2013 
A. THE REVOLUTION 
On December 4, 2011, the Snow Revolution erupted after the Russian legislative 
elections and breathed hope of oppositional comeback into Russian contentious politics.114 
These protests, which were spontaneously organized by journalists and drew in those in 
opposition to the Russian government, were motivated by a widespread concern that the 
results of the elections had been corrupted. As New York Times journalist Ellen Barry wrote 
just days after the protests began, “The demonstration marked what opposition leaders hope 
will be a watershed moment, ending years of quiet acceptance of the political consolidation 
Mr. Putin introduced.”115 Or, as New York Times journalist Julia Loffe noted, “It was a far 
cry from the conventional wisdom, often Kremlin-sponsored, of Russians’ apathy and 
disgust for politics. Today, it turned out that no one’s been apathetic, that everyone has 
been reading and watching and following. Today was just the first time that all of these 
people came out and discovered each other’s existence.”116  
The 2011 protests marked the most significant public uprising against Putin-
influenced corruption, and the beginning of a larger social movement that would act in 
opposition to Putin’s style of governance. Putin had governed Russia as president from 
2000–2008. The constitution required that he step down after two terms, and he was 
replaced by his prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, who was elected president in 2008. They 
revitalized the otherwise gloomy Russian opposition as a whole.117 Upon Putin’s return to 
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the presidency in 2012, pro-government demonstrations began to surface in response to 
these anti-government protests, intensifying the sphere of contentious politics in Russia. 
The Snow Revolution of 2011 marked a resurrection of government opposition 
movements of contentious politics in Russia (as well as the first great success of 
mobilization in civil society). As is brought to light in the previous chapter, the Snow 
Revolution erupted in response to the notion that the election results for the national 
legislative body had been tampered with by the government or those in close association 
to the government. According to the Global Nonviolent Action Database, after it was 
announced that Putin’s United Russia party won 52.88% of the seats, voters began to reveal 
their experiences with the election fraud: 
State employees stated that superiors pressured them to vote for United 
Russia, poll watchers claimed that election officials stuffed ballot boxes and 
purposefully miscounted votes, and representatives of United Russia took 
some individuals to multiple polling locations so that they could vote more 
than once.118  
The news of such egregious violations of free and fair elections sparked the generation of 
numerous small government opposition groups that quickly gathered en masse. These 
demonstrations involved anywhere between 25,000 to 120,000 people (exact numbers are 
difficult to estimate, and the Russian government worked to keep these numbers minimal 
with protest restrictions and threats) and lasted into 2013.  
Such a massive response is due, in part, to the fact that the opposition mobilized 
people to demonstrate for, “Anyone but United Russia,” which nixed issue-specific votes 
or protests and united the entire opposition under one goal: to keep Putin out of the 
presidency in the 2012 election.119 The Snow Revolution, initially sparked by journalists 
in Russia but taken over to Alexei Navalny, brought otherwise ordinary and relatively quiet 
people of Russia together to call for honest elections and the political representation they 
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desired and voted for, rather than that which was the result of forgery.120 This is what 
Navalny sought to achieve in his many acts of involvement in contentious politics: 
mobilization of the citizenry (rather than the party) against the corruption of the state.121 
As this thesis will review in the coming chapters, street demonstrations do not 
necessarily mean that clear, well-structured opposition groups were immediately organized 
and functioning fluently. There was (and, to some degree, still is) a considerable amount 
of disarray among opposition groups, and many of them would come to disagree 
ideologically and structurally (based on leadership and hierarchies) for years to come. 
Opposition groups within Russian civil society at the time of the Snow Revolution certainly 
had numerous improvements to make, both as individual groups and as a network of 
groups. Communication, ideologies, and priorities were among several of the items that 
commonly led to strife within these groups. With that said, the mobilization of the citizen 
in contentious politics was a landmark in the progression of Russian citizenship and 
politics.122 The action taken by Russian citizens to stand up against those in power sparked 
hope for the future of Russian politics and the potential for reform.123   
B. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
At the spark of the Snow Revolution, the government quickly reacted by setting in 
motion pro-Putin and pro-government rallies to match (if not to overpower) the voices of 
the opposition movement. The first powerful event in the Snow Revolution (involving at 
least 35,000 protestors and possibly up to 100,000) came on December 10, 2011, after 
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around a week of smaller protests that helped the movement to gain momentum.124 In 
immediate response, Putin generated at least partially staged rallies in support of him, his 
regime, and his reelection. These rallies occurred in relatively large numbers and over 
many days, aiming to, “Protect rule of law and prevent an Orange Revolution scenario from 
happening in Russia.”125 These numbers, however, might not have been a clear 
representation of willingness to support Putin. Instead, reporters like Michael Schwirtz 
have said that many of the participants at these rallies refused to speak to any press, were 
forced to participate by their place of business, or had been told to attend the rallies instead 
of their cancelled classes at universities.126 The opposition that took part in the Snow 
Revolution was forcibly minimized and dissolved on several occasions by the government 
and police; meanwhile, all pro-Putin rallies were granted the opportunity to assemble in 
the thousands, as seen in the apparent forceful encouragement of attendance. All Russian 
media coverage was heavily controlled surrounding the opposition movement. While the 
western media widely reported anti-regime demonstrations in Moscow following the 
accused flawed parliamentary elections, “Russian television gave as much, if not more, 
weight to pro-regime rallies organized by Nashi.”127 While Russians were more likely to 
see coverage of pro-Putin protests, foreigners were more likely to see coverage of anti-
regime protests. Over the course of just a few months, numerous rallies of this nature took 
place in favor of Putin and the government as it stood at that time, all in response to the 
opposition.  
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The Snow Revolution, while initially successful in mass mobilization and taking 
the government by surprise, lost momentum quickly. There was no sustainable plan or 
resources for continued protest.128 The opposition also failed to vocalize specific elements 
of the regime and its soft-authoritarianism while it had momentum and widespread 
mobilization, which showed disjuncture within the opposition ranks.129 With the 
opposition’s quickly weakened position, the state’s response developed in the form of 
stricter legislation against opposition protests.130 According to Vladimir Gel’man, as a 
result of the Snow Revolution, “Opposition parties and candidates were not allowed to run 
in September 2014 sub-national elections, the organizational potential of the opposition 
was challenged, and its very capacity to serve as organized political dissent came under 
question.”131 A new law was furthermore passed in 2012, which required that any 
politically involved social group receiving international funding register itself as a foreign 
agent.132 Under this new law (which would only expand in the coming years), definitions 
of political involvement were so vague that practically every social movement would have 
to register as a foreign agent, to include human rights groups.133 As Gel’man stated, since 
the Snow Revolution, “The scope of abuse and repression against the opposition (and 
threats thereof) [has] dramatically increased.”134  
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Overall, the state-implemented repercussions of the opposition’s Snow Revolution 
have come in effort to prevent revolution and maintain stability within the Russian state. 
In doing so, the state has stepped further away from genuine democracy as it has 
complicated or made illegal a majority of opposition efforts (protest, political campaigning, 
social movements, etc.). To further complicate the political landscape, many of the 2011–
2012 opposition leading figures quickly lost public authority, which opened opportunities 
for other opposition leaders (perhaps of different, nondemocratic ideologies) to rise to the 
occasion. With one of the issues of the Snow Revolution having been that groups could not 
mobilize under actual ideologies, this also meant that the opposition could splinter 
further.135 
The coming chapter will cover contentious politics in the post-Snow Revolution 
era, revealing how the impacts of the Snow Revolution and the government’s response 
might impacted street demonstrations since 2013.  
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V. CONTENTIOUS POLITICS AFTER THE SNOW 
REVOLUTION, 2013–2019 
To understand exactly how and to what extent contentious politics reared its head 
in Russia following the Snow Revolution, it is necessary to review the demonstrations that 
have occurred since. This chapter is especially dedicated to the most noteworthy 
demonstrations of contentious politics organized by Russia’s most contemporary street 
opposition. It will discuss demonstrations of both those in opposition to the government 
and those in support of the government, to allow attention to any protests that might have 
surfaced in reaction to one another. In presenting the progression of action among Russian 
citizens in this manner, it will be clear that, although there are two opposing sides of within 
street demonstrations in this situation, both sides represent contentious politics since the 
Snow Revolution of 2011.  
Numerous protests have taken place since the Snow Revolution, regardless of 
added difficulties to participate in street politics. Many of them, however, are still 
organized are micro issues rather than broader ideological issues against the regime. In 
2015, for example, international sanctions and the resulting unpaid wages severely 
impacted teachers and autoworkers, among others.136 In response, workers took to protest 
and strike across the nation, marking, “the first backlash against Putin’s economic 
policies.”137 The main impetus behind these demonstrations, in contrast to the anti-regime 
motivation behind the Snow Revolution, was the economy. In November of the same year, 
trucker protests broke out in response to a new road tax that the truckers could not 
afford.138 Here again, as Harding argued in 2009, Putin had violated the tacit social 
contract that had previously kept the general population out of politics with a promise of 
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social benefits in exchange.139 However, because Putin’s government does not want a 
politically active or rebellious population, micro-issues such as these have historically been 
resolved and largely forgotten.140 As they have done historically in Russia, such issue-
focused demonstrations come and go in considerably brief waves. It is important to 
recognize, though, that Putin’s breach of the social contract is a significant impetus for 
contentious politics and social movements.  
In the case of 2018 protests against waste disposal in the region surrounding 
Moscow, Putin failed to honor the social contract yet again. In allowing garbage trucks to 
overfill landfills in the outskirts of Moscow, citizens were endangered with polluted water 
and noxious fumes.141 As Laura Henry wrote, “As a scholar who studies contemporary 
Russian politics, I believe these garbage protests reveal a crisis of basic governance that 
potentially poses a greater challenge to Putin’s government than pro-democracy 
activism.”142 These protests had potential for great involvement, as Henry said, if for no 
reason other than the crisis could have been easily avoided by the regime. This movement 
came in the heat of the 2017–2018 nationwide anti-corruption protests, which could signal 
that the government was too pre-occupied by the opposition to have made a more careful 
decision. 
The 2017–2018 anti-corruption protests were led by Alexei Navalny.143 They arose 
to speak out against and raise awareness of the corruption within the Putin regime.144 
These protests were sparked in March of 2017 by a film “He Is Not Dimon to You,” 
produced by the Anti-Corruption Foundation, which revealed that Russia’s Prime Minister, 
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Dmitry Medvedev, was alleged to have embezzled more than $1billion from state funds.145 
Russian authorities threatened the protestors by warning that police would, “‘bear no 
responsibility for any possible negative consequences’ for people who did show up. Putin’s 
spokesman said that even telling people to come to the rallies was ‘illegal.’”146 Still, after 
such threats, thousands of people in opposition to the government showed up in response 
to reports of the government’s corrupt nature.147 Navalny was arrested during these 
demonstrations, along with over 700 other participants.148 Police used physical force 
against protestors, as well as tear gas. Such demonstrations in the name of anti-corruption 
occurred at various times between 2017 and 2018, continually pressuring the Russian 
government to acknowledge and address its flaws. With these events unfolding, the Levada 
Center determined that, between 2017 and the fall of 2018, public opinion of Putin as 
“Completely trustworthy” dropped from 75% to 58%, while opinion of him as “Somewhat 
trustworthy” or “Not at all trustworthy” each climbed by just less than 10%.149 Putin’s 
approval ratings remained high. 
Rather than acknowledging the criticism of the 2017–2018 opposition movement, 
however, the Kremlin moved in quite the opposite direction. Nationwide pro-Putin rallies 
were scheduled for February 3, 2018, just before presidential election season, so as to boost 
voter turnout (specifically, voter turnout for Putin).150 According to the Moscow Times, 
“the Feb. 3 pro-Kremlin action has been timed to coincide with the 75th anniversary of the 
victory in the Battle of Stalingrad.”151 World War II has been a central symbol in Putin’s 
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patriotic education of the public in effort to restore national pride, as well as his personal 
popularity.152 It was said that around 130,000 participants showed up; however, sources 
still express confidence that, like rallies of the past, many of those participants were forced 
or paid to attend.153 Rallies such as this have been commonly produced by the Kremlin, 
and have typically resulted in a cycle of protests against and rallies for Putin’s governance. 
Additionally, violations of human rights continued, with one example being the arrest of 
journalist Svetlana Prokopyeva under accusations of justification of terrorism, for negative 
comments made against authorities in November of 2018.154 In February of 2019, the 
European Commissioner for Human Rights claimed the arrest was a violation of 
Prokopyeva’s right to free press and expression, and was a sign of the government’s 
continued effort to further control the media and the opposition.155  
The most recent series of opposition protest have taken place in late 2018 and early 
2019. In September of 2018, pensioners took to the streets once again, this time to protest 
the planned increase to the retirement age.156 This is another example of Putin’s breaking 
of his social contract in that the raised retirement age would theoretically make life harder 
for the older population. Under Navalny’s leadership, these issue-specific and economics-
oriented protests resulted in the detainment of over 800 people, and the participation of 
around 2,000.157 These protests were organized initially for pensioners, but attracted youth 
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participants and widened the anti-pension-reform message to a broader one, saying, 
“Russia will be free.”158  
In March, around 15,000 participants showed in Moscow to protest a “sovereign 
Internet” bill, although official police reports only acknowledged around 6,500 
participants, and at least 15 people are thought to have been detained.159 Banners and signs 
were also confiscated.160 In April 2019, the new cyber-security law passed that grants the 
Russian government great power over domestic internet.161 This new law, according to the 
government, will achieve Russian sovereignty over the Internet, improving cyber security 
and isolating Russia’s Internet from the rest of the world.162 According to the opposition, 
however, this law will only allow the government to achieve a firmer grip over censorship 
and contention among the population, especially considering social media was a major 
platform of protest organization in 2011.163 It will be a means for greater control over the 
Russian people and, therefore, less concern for Putin about his popularity and acceptance 
within the nation. It is also expected that this law will result in a sort of online “Iron 
Curtain,” and will bear striking resemblance to the Internet firewall implemented by 
Chinese communist President Xi Jinping.164 The greatest common fear amongst opponents 
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of this law can be best summarized by one protestor: “If we do nothing it will get worse. 
The authorities will keep following their own way and the point of no return will be 
passed.”165 This law is yet another example of the Putin regime’s tendency to mold a 
government under the label of “sovereign democracy,” fitting nicely into the definition of 
soft-authoritarianism presented in Chapter I of this thesis. Putin’s approval has fallen from 
around 90% to around 60% since 2018.166  
Most recently, a May Day (May 1st) opposition protest calling for free elections 
resulted in detainment of around 124 people.167 Also in early 2019, a new law was passed 
which, according to PEN America, “Establish[es] criminal penalties for people deemed by 
courts to have involved minors in unauthorized protests, rallies, and demonstrations.”168 
An extension of further control over contentious politics, the new law could potentially 
arrest a number of active youth participants and older organizers. The same PEN America 
article reveals that, during the 2018 anti-corruption protests, 158 minors were detained on 
May 8 alone.169 An article by Masha Gessen of the New York Review Daily revealed that, 
in June of 2017, nationwide protests occurred with teenagers making up a large portion of 
the participants, several of whom were detained.170 The recent aftermath of the post-Snow 
Revolution have demonstrate the cyclical nature of Russian contentious politics: opposition 
breeds hope that the state has not managed to control Russia’s contentious politics 
completely. The opposition has showed continues to demonstrate in small ways, the 
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government responds with new legislation minimizing freedom of assembly or 
authoritarian crackdown, and the cycle continues.  
Aside from the generation of pro-government response rallies, in most cases, the 
Russian authorities have reacted to post-Snow-Revolution demonstrations with soft 
attempts to combat them. In other words, they have taken action in attempt to prevent or 
limit opposition protests by increasing the cost of permits and/or refusing to grant permits 
for the occurrence of some of the protests, for more than a few people at the protests, for 
amount of time allowed to spend protesting, etc.171 The police have evidently been 
instructed to continue to detain people at nearly all of the opposition protests detailed, 
regardless of their peaceful nature.172 The police have also reported smaller than actual 
numbers of participants at protests, and have reported larger than supposed numbers of 
participants at pro-government rallies.173 The government’s recent crackdown on Internet 
freedom, as well as the new Internet sovereignty law, are likely direct responses to the anti-
government activism. Laws have also been generated that prevent anyone who has been 
arrested from running for any elected office, which practically targets any/all of the 
opposition group members who have come to any sort of leadership in their groups, 
including Navalny. The state has expressed that changes such as this are to prevent 
potentially scandalous people from entering and participating in politics. More meaningful 
to Putin and his regime, however, is that these changes will likely reduce any potential for 
threat to Putin’s leadership, or his style of governance. The state’s reaction to opposition 
movements has been, in essence, a rejection of freedom of association, freedom of speech, 
and government transparency--basic elements of democracy.  
Following the Snow Revolution, contentious politics in Russia continued their 
presence, although on a much smaller scale than during the 2011–2013 demonstrations. 
Government support rallies arose, opposition rallies against the general corruption of the 
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regime resurfaced periodically, and issue-focused demonstrations surfaced according to 
the timing of the incidents that sparked them. The Putin regime continued to crack down 
on contentious politics, however, and has added increasing difficulty to the ability to 
mobilize legally in opposition to the state.  
The coming chapter will provide survey data and analysis regarding the overall 
shifts in Russian propensity to protest over time.   
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VI. PROPENSITY TO PROTEST OVER TIME 
Now that the most prominent examples of Russia’s contentious politics have been 
reviewed, this thesis will analyze the civic inclination to act in such demonstrations over 
this thirty-year period. This section of the chapter will detail how Russian citizens feel 
about their government based primarily on survey data, as ratings could be indicative of 
potential for future change via demands, votes, or action of the Russian people. 
The general trend of Russian contentious politics over the past thirty years has 
changed little, with a few spikes in participation here and there. Figure 2 compares Russian 
poll answers to the question “Do you wish to participate in protests” (the dark blue line) to 
“Will you participate in protests” (the light blue line).174 While responses to the former 
question have been recorded since 1997, responses to the latter have only been recorded 
since around 2009. The graph reveals that the number of people who responded “Yes” to 
the first question spiked immensely in the late 1990s after Yeltsin’s regime had been in 
power for several years. The number then plummeted around 1999/2000, when Putin’s 
regime came in with a more “vigilant” approach to civic political action. This was also the 
time when Russians expressed great apathy toward contentious politics, distrusted the 
government, and failed to believe that their actions could make a difference. With the Civic 
Forum in 2001, desire to protest rose again, with an overall slight increase until 2005 when 
Putin was up for reelection, the first pensioners protest took place, and just after the Orange 
Revolution broke out. The numbers settled to a net zero gain or loss in interest to participate 
politically, until 2010 and especially 2011 with the Snow Revolution. The graph shows an 
overall decrease in interest to protest over political issues after 2012, until around 2017 
when the anti-corruption campaign picked up. While the fluctuation of “yes” responses to 
the second question generally reflect the trend of the first question, the number of “yes” 
responses to the question “will you participate in demonstrations?” were consistently 
lower. This suggests that, between 2009 and 2018, the average Russian citizen’s 
willingness to protest was lower than the affirmative idea of protest. This could reflect the 
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general trend of apathy toward participation in contentious politics and the potential benefit 
thereof. Overall, from 1997 to 2018, the net change shows that fewer people responded 
positively when asked if they wished to participate in protests.  
 
Figure 2. Russian Civilian Desire versus Will to Protest, 
1997–2018175  
Although desire to participate in protests displays around a net zero change, the 
overall approval of Putin decreased and disapproval increased since 2000. Figure 3 shows 
those who responded with approval of the President (the dark blue line) compared to those 
who responded in disapproval (the light blue line) over the course of his leaderships (to 
include his period as Prime Minister from 2008–2012).176 Because the two lines reflect 
each other directly, this analysis will only include that of the approval responses. Putin’s 
approval ratings began high with the start of his Presidency in 1999, with over 80% of 
respondents approving of him. They dropped marginally in 2001, around the time of the 
Civic Forum, gradually increased until 2004, and dropped again in 2005 to approximately 
65% approval after the Ukrainian Orange Revolution and the Russian pensioners protest. 
                                                 
175 Source: Ibid. 
176 Ibid. 
49 
Putin’s approval ratings slowly increased until a peak above 80% in 2009. The midterm 
elections in 2010 and subsequent Snow Revolution brought Putin’s approval down to its 
lowest levels, though. It remained around 65% until 2014 when it was above or at 80%, 
likely in response to the annexation of Crimea.177 This continued until 2017, when Putin’s 
approval rating dropped to its lowest levels with the anti-corruption protests. At that time, 
the percentage of Russians evincing complete trust in Putin fell from 75% to 58%.178 
 
Figure 3. Public Approval of Vladimir Putin, 1999–2018179  
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When compared to one another, public opinion regarding likelihood of 
participating in political protest and approval of Vladimir Putin reveal the inverted 
relationship between the average Russian’s desire to protest and approval of Putin. As 
approval ratings increased, desire to protest decreased, and vice versa. This trend has 
followed suit throughout Putin’s regime, with the most recent approval ratings sharply 
lower and desire/willingness to protest markedly increased. The polling data also suggests 
what social movement theory contends, that events provide windows of opportunity for 
organizers to mobilize latent discontent against the regime. These cycles of protest are 
difficult to sustain in their absence. 
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VII. ANTI-GOVERNMENT MOVEMENTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the coming chapter, this thesis will examine three groups of Russians who have 
led anti-regime social movements. While Chapter II discussed the most significant 
examples of street demonstrations in Russian politics, the aim of this chapter is to gain a 
more thorough understanding of the most prominent groups or persons involved in and 
organizing such actions. This chapter describes these groups and then analyzes the 
characteristics that social movement theorists have set forth as potentially determining of 
resilience. This are: collective identities, claims, resources, organizational style and 
membership (paying close attention to any prerequisites or qualifications necessary for 
acceptance in those groups, recruiting into the groups, as well as requirements or 
expectations to remain a member), and mobilization capabilities. This research analysis of 
social movements and the ability (or lack thereof) to mobilize people will allow the 
opportunity to observe some of the details within Russian society that are essential for 
evaluating the prospects for Russia’s transition to a consolidated democracy. The research 
will follow the chronological organization of the previous chapter, beginning with analysis 
of Oborona (Defense), a group existing prior to the Snow Revolution, then some of the 
main journalists who organized the beginnings of the Snow Revolution, and finally Alexei 
Navalny and the followership he created during and after the Snow Revolution.  
B. OBORONA  
Oborona was a sort of super-group that is comprised of a network of other 
movements, to include Youth Yabloko, the Union of Right Forces party, both associated 
with opposition political parties, and Walking without Putin, among others.180 Although it 
included politically affiliated groups and operates within the political sphere (especially 
that of street politics), Oborona itself remained intentionally independent and nonpartisan. 
Co-founded in 2005 by several pre-existing youth groups, Oborona “was the first 
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opposition group that openly criticized Putin and broke ‘the conspiracy of silence,’ which 
had kept President Putin outside of all critique.”181 Although it officially dissolved in 
2011, the group was labeled a threat to the stability of Russia at its founding, largely 
because of its aim to reform the regime in the name of democratic principles as the color 
revolutions had done.182  
Two of its primary co-founders and leading figures, Ilya Valeryevich Yashin and 
Yulia Sergeevna Malysheva, said that the overarching goal of this youth movement was to 
encourage civil society, activism, and critical analysis among Russia’s youth, with the hope 
of expanding outward toward other Russian demographics.183 Such expansion was initially 
well accomplished, recruiting hundreds of members within the Moscow branch alone, with 
an inclusive recruitment process that was largely possible due to its intentional avoidance 
of political affiliation.184 One translation of the group’s website, while it was in full 
operation until about 2011, reads, “Joining up is easy, just fill out a form on this site, and 
we will be connected with you. In Oborona we have no membership cards or dues payments 
(as in the political parties).”185 Oborona’s initial ability to reach a broad spectrum of people 
could have been due in part to its inclusive manner of attaining and maintaining 
membership. Structurally, there existed decision makers among its internal network (the 
elected committee members), as well as regional subgroups that were largely 
autonomous.186 The group’s influence spread outward to twenty-five of Russia’s regions 
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(with headquarters in Moscow), though its numbers never grew much beyond a 
thousand.187 A 2007 map of Oborona’s regional presence can be seen in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Oborona’s Regional Presence, 2007188 
While the group enjoyed some success in its first year, its promise for a bright future 
quickly faded. After about a year, mobilization diminished and the horizontally organized 
sectors of the group began to splinter.189 A 2010 interview with its third co-founder, Oleg 
Kozlovsky, revealed that regional sectors and factions were at an all-time low.190 Between 
2011 and 2012, the group largely dissolved with the reelection of Vladimir Putin and new 
legislation that restricted civic activism.191 Although this group represents a movement 
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that failed to thrive in the face of Putinism, it is important to evaluate it in effort to 
understand the overall potential for durability of anti-regime social movements. 
1. Collective Identity and Claims 
This far-reaching youth movement identified under the following ideologies: 
greater liberties, free elections, honest democratic governance, and anti-putinist regime. In 
an interview with academic Fredo Arias-King, Malysheva specified that this group was 
more than just anti-Putin, it should be specified, in saying that Oborona is, “Against the 
‘putinist’ regime, with a small ‘p,’ since it does not necessarily depend on Putin but is a 
manifestation of totalitarian impulses in our society.”192 The significance here is that the 
group has formed in opposition to more than just Putin (who will eventually no longer be 
president). Rather, Malysheva helped to develop a collection of people who additionally 
identified with the prevention of totalitarianism returning to Russia, even post-Putin. This 
concept is significant to Oborona, as the movement maintained a goal beyond Putin that 
was to push for liberation so long as totalitarianism held a grip over Russia, even in a post-
Putin world. Such desired liberties are well summarized below, from Oborona’s 
“Declaration of Purpose”: 
We want to live in a free and flourishing country. We want a combat-
effective and professional army to protect us, and freedom for students to 
study in peace. We want the democratic transfers of power via free elections 
in which the whole country actively participates. We want to be able to 
obtain information from a free and independent media. We want to work in 
companies without fearing that they will be shut down because of the visits 
of bandits or corrupt officials. We want the law to be equally applied to all 
citizens, not used as tool against those who disagree. We want an honest 
budget in which there are monies valid social purposes, not the pockets of 
corrupt officials.193 
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Freedom was the overarching concern for those involved with Oborona—freedom 
and a trustworthy government. The primary claim the movement operated under, in the 
same vein, was that which declared putinism (in other words, Russian totalitarianism) as a 
prominent force within Russian politics and against the liberation of the Russian people. 
Oborona sought to achieve a form of democracy that emulated those of western forms. 
This, however, was perhaps the sole claim that members and regional branches of the 
movement could agree to.194 Politically, the group diverged, which Lyytikäinen argues 
aided in the group’s dissolution, especially as the movement was pushed leftward on the 
political spectrum in its later years with the election of one of its unofficial leaders to 
parliament in representation of the Union of Right Forces.195   
2. Resources 
Before continuing into further analysis of Oborona, its resources should be 
mentioned. In terms of resources, information is are thus far largely unavailable in English 
texts. What is available in English, such as the work by Laura Lyytikäinen, reveals that 
Oborona’s biggest resource is its people: middle class youth.196 According to Lyytikäinen, 
this fraction of Russian society gave Oborona its chance at survival because of the time, 
resources, and energy its participants have been able to dedicate as youth with a decent 
financial standing and enough time to spare for the movement.197 However, because of 
Oborona’s outright distaste for Putin and the regime he has created, the state was especially 
watchful of the group and ensured strict state-management over its administrative and 
financial resources, as well as access to news media and formal politics.198 
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3. Organization and Membership 
The organization style of Oborona was unique in that, rather than operating under 
a vertical hierarchy, the group operated instead through horizontal networking. There was 
no centralized structure, leader, etc.199 Instead, this decidedly politically independent 
group had the organizational freedom to grant equal strength and opportunity to each 
regional location, member, etc. Horizontal relations among its regional sectors, other 
Russian regime opposition groups, and even international groups (such as some that have 
participated in Color Revolutions) allowed Oborona its unique and inclusive functionality, 
and was designed to avoid development of elitism of any individuals over others within the 
movement.200 However effective this horizontal approach appeared in principle, it led the 
movement to internal struggle. The concept of a “leaderless” movement was not fully 
executed, as Lyytikäinen detailed:   
Both Moscow and St Petersburg’s branches had four to five coordinators 
who were responsible for their own fields of activities, such as public 
relations, human relations, or street activism, as well as one strong figure, 
who was seen by many activists and outsiders as the leader of the group 
despite the leaderless principle.201 
Lyytikäinen shed light on the still existent tendency of this group to generate some form of 
hierarchy, even within the horizontal networking system. Leadership naturally developed 
within the regional branches. She also mentioned that Oborona’s reliance on friendship ties 
formulated a difficult environment for new, socially unconnected members to incorporate 
into the group, thus furthering division issues.202 Malysheva said that this horizontal 
existence was instrumental in the generation of a greater opposition force, which was one 
of Oborona’s key concerns: 
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Anyone who struggles for democracy, freedom, for honest elections, civil 
society, those are our allies. [This] also means that we can work in parallel 
and not intervene with one another. Or sometimes we can form provisional 
coalitions with those that also think they can do a better job than Putin.203 
According to Malysheva, Oborona aimed to include the masses, provided those involved 
were for democracy and freedom. In such an open manner of existence and inclusivity, 
Oborona could remain free of political influence, while simultaneously encouraging other 
groups to flourish and grow. However, in practice, such goals of inclusive equality were 
not well met. According to Malysheva, in its first year, the group, “Oborona organized 
about fifty public activities [and had] twenty-two regional branches.”204 The first year of 
the movement’s founding was also its most successful, however. After that point, its 
participation numbers declined, regional branches closed frequently, and leaders took 
different paths, soon leading to the group’s dissolution. 
4. Mobilization Capabilities 
Oborona experienced initial success in mobilization, both nationally and abroad, 
upon its founding in 2005, generating a membership of about 1,000, with Moscow and St. 
Petersburg together amounting for four hundred members.205 On the first birthday of the 
group, a celebration took place in the form of powerful demonstrations.206 This included, 
according to Malysheva:  
A street protest called “Enough of Putin…” [and] a few radical activities, 
one of which made us famous worldwide-when we organized a big protest 
in Belarus together with Ukrainians and with opposition Belarusians, in 
April 2005 during the anniversary of the Chernobyl accident.207  
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Not only does this exemplify Oborona’s early will to mobilize, but also its influence 
on others to do so, however short-lived such influence might have been. The initial efforts 
of this movement extended to and interacted with movements of other nations (in the case 
of the aforementioned demonstrations, Belarus and Ukraine). These protests operated 
under the slogan “For your freedom and ours” (which suggested that the action was based 
on a call for civic freedom and liberation), included five to ten thousand people, and 
continued to survive even once it had been forbidden by the authorities.208 Such will to 
mobilize is essential in achieving the long-term goal of groups similar to Oborona—to 
bring any trace of authoritarianism to a halt in favor of democracy—in that a group must 
remain relevant and undaunting when faced with the government in order to achieve 
anything similar to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (which serves as a huge inspiration 
to Oborona). 
However, the mobilization of this group quickly began to fail after 2006. At this 
time, when Yashin left the movement, Oborona’s regional locations began to operate under 
leadership of other different movements and, therefore, differing ideologies.209 As of 2012, 
Oborona was found to have included no more than 1,000 participants, with only a few of 
those participants still active.210 It seems the greatest downfall in Oborona’s mobilization 
was the tendency for events to have gathered independently from one another, rather than 
collectively in one demonstration.211  
C. THE SNOW REVOLUTION AND THE NEW DECEMBRISTS 
Although eventually taken over largely by opposition politicians, the initial gravity 
of the Snow Revolution was inspired by a group of journalists who came to be known as 
the New Decembrists. With the 2012 elections on the horizon, and public tolerance toward 
the corruption that taunted the freedom of those elections, journalists were the motivated 
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few who decided change needed to take place in the undeniably apathetic Russia.212 As 
firsthand witness and chronicler Michael Idov wrote, “The entire point of Putin’s 
meticulously constructed ‘power vertical,’ a concept that essentially disabled all levers of 
governance except the president’s, was that spontaneous mass protests could not and would 
not happen.”213 Under Putin, major television networks came under state control, regional 
officials shifted from civilian-elected to Kremlin-appointed positions, the voice of 
Parliament has been diminished, and Putin’s United Russia party has monopolized the 
political scene.214 In summary, Putin’s soft-authoritarianism was settling in. The 
journalists-turned-revolutionaries began what would become the Snow Revolution 
because, as Ilya Krasilshchik summarized clearly, “The system was held together not by 
top-down oppression but by bottom-up cowardice.” The journalists realized that their prior 
duty to recommend “a good restaurant [was] no longer enough.”215 The Russian public 
had become tolerant and complacent and, as Krasilshchik suggested, the nation’s 
journalists had been writing pieces no more influential than a sway toward a well cooked 
meal.216 Finally, after Medvedev practically announced Putin’s return and evidence of 
gross electoral fraud began to mount around the country, the group of journalists who made 
up the New Decembrists were the few who felt the drive and duty to awaken the Russian 
public.217  
Although over twenty journalists can be credited with having a hand in the public 
mobilization within the Snow Revolution, a select few will be reviewed (in addition to the 
New Decembrists movement as a whole) with emphasis on their efforts since 2012. The 
greater list of these journalists includes the likes of Ilya Krasilshchik, Filipp Dzyadko, 
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Katya Krongauz, Denis Bilunov, Roman Dobrokhotov, Sergei Udaltsov, Ilya Klishin, 
Sergei Parkhomenko, Masha Gessen, and Oleg Kashin, among many others. To understand 
the initial efforts of the New Decembrists and the continued spirit thereof, however, this 
section will focus on Krasilshchik, Dzyadko, and Udaltsov.  
At the time of the first major demonstrations at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow 
(events which soon came to be referred to as “Bolotnaya”), Krasilshchik was a major 
influencer At the time of Bolotnaya. At the age of 21, right around the time of the 
revolution, “Krasilshchik became the editor in chief of the eponymous magazine [Afisha], 
which had a hundred-thousand copy run.”218 In continuation of his impact as a young 
journalist and activist, in 2013, he, “Stepped down… to become the Product Director at 
Afisha publishing company, launching three separate web-based media and а TV streaming 
service in one year.” In 2014, “he finally left Afisha, and together with two partners 
launched Meduza, a groundbreaking Russian language web news outlet based in Riga, 
Latvia.”219 It is unclear whether Krasilshchik has been exiled from Russia, but he has 
elected to continue his work on Russian relations and media with Latvia as his base.  
Dzyadko is another notable young journalist and activist who remains active in 
similar work today. Comparable in early career and ambition to Krasilshchik, Dzyadko, 
“Took the reins at Bolshoi Gorod [a news magazine]… at twenty-five.”220 Since the Snow 
Revolution, his work has been dedicated to the removal of politicization from education of 
and discussion surrounding history. He has been working toward this goal with his project 
Arzamas, “Which tries to popularize the cultural achievements of the past.”221 Founded in 
2015, Dzyadko and his network of academics utilize social media as a source of education 
for the general public, thus treating this education as a sort of liberty in contrast to the 
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patriotic education championed by Putin. Arzamas has been at the center of Dzyadko’s 
efforts since its founding. “The name ‘Arzamas’ is a deliberate choice and hints at how 
Dzyadko and his team see themselves as more than just a straightforward education 
resource. The name of a progressive, 19th century literary society, Arzamas’ members went 
on to have a huge impact on Russian society: from poet Alexander Pushkin to arch-
conservative Sergei Uvarov who invented the tsarist ideology of ‘Orthodoxy, Autocracy 
and Nationalist.’”222 In the effort toward accessible education, Dzyadko has furthermore 
aided in the creation of a Web TV show called Dzyadko 3, “which has become a defacto 
anti-Putin brainstorming session.”223 Although decidedly more politically concerned than 
Arzamas, this internet show keeps open the discussion surrounding the opposition agenda. 
Filipp, according to journalist Anna Nemstova, believes that protests (and, thus, the 
encouragement thereof) will, “... help strengthen grass-roots democracy in Russia.”224 
This show played an active role in the mobilization for the Snow Revolution, particularly 
Bolotnaya, in that it helped to inform its viewers (via the free internet) of the government/
election corruption issues, the possibility for discussion of such issues, and the potential to 
make a change through means of peaceful demonstration.225  
Sergei Udaltsov is considerably older than the other New Decembrists, but still 
began his political activism at a young age. According to journalist Olga Khvostunova, 
He organized the Red Youth Vanguard (AKM) movement that eventually 
became the youth wing of Viktor Ampilov’s Labor Russia movement. Later 
still, AKM joined Russia’s Communist Party. In 2005, Udaltsov 
participated in the creation of the Left Front, a radical leftist organization 
that advocated socialist development in Russia.226 
                                                 
222 Ibid. 




226 Olga Khvostunova, “Russia’s Political Prisoners: Sergei Udaltsov,” Institute of Modern Russia, 
accessed June 12, 2019, https://imrussia.org/en/projects/political-prisoners/746-russias-political-prisoners-
sergei-udaltsov.  
62 
He and his Left Front furthermore played a role in leadership and mobilization of 
Bolotnaya.227 The Left Front and Udaltsov have since been, “neutralized,” and, 
“discredited,” by the Kremlin, as the movement’s networking and horizontal 
communication capabilities were seen as a threat to the Putin regime.228 In 2013, following 
the Snow Revolution, Udaltsov was placed on house arrest and, later, was sentenced to 
over four years in prison for his hand in organizing Bolotnaya.229 He was released in 2017, 
only to continue his work with the opposition.230 In 2018, he led some of the numerous 
protests against the increased pension age, and was sentenced to thirty more days in jail for 
violating public gathering regulations.231 He has been arrested on several other occasions; 
still, his efforts have continued in the form of issue-based protests that create links to the 
greater issue of governmental corruption.232 
This coming analysis within this section of the chapter will lay out the 
measurements of durability, set forth by social movement theory, in relation to the New 
Decembrists and their following as a whole. 
1. Collective Identity and Claims 
The New Decembrists and their followers collectively identified against corruption 
of the government and, especially, against an apathetic public. According to Idov, “On 
September 24, 2011… Medvedev got up in front of the United Russia congress and simply 
announced Putin was coming back. There would be no competition from within the party, 
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no primaries, no campaign. There would be, for all intents and purposes, no real 
election.”233 Putin’s casual walk back into political power signified a lack of legitimacy in 
the electoral process, which the journalists and their followers stood vehemently against in 
favor of free elections. However, this movement also recognized that the apathy of the 
Russian public was of concern. After the chaotic instability of 1990s post-Soviet Russia, 
the Russian people generated a culture of passivity toward Putin’s regime, so long as Putin 
maintained economic and national security in exchange (referred to in the previous 
chapters as Putin’s social contract).234 The younger fraction of society (including the 
revolutionaries) did not remember the hardship of instability, and were ready to sacrifice it 
for change.235  
The overarching claim the movement operated under was a lack of real political 
freedom. The movement’s efforts included a call for free and honest elections. According 
to Idov,  
On December 4, 2011,… United Russia operatives were seen bring bused 
from polling station to polling station to vote multiple times… institutions 
such as schools, army bases, and, in one infamous case, a mental hospital, 
delivered nearly 100 percent of the vote to Putin’s party… Observers saw 
neat stacks of prefilled ballots shoved into boxes. Those who tried to point 
out the irregularities were shown the door.236  
This widely shared experience of electoral fraud aided in motivating the masses to 
join in the protests and call for elections that honestly reflected the desires of the country. 
Five major demands of the movement are well summarized as follows: “Freedom for 
political prisoners; forfeit of the election results; investigation of the head of the Central 
Elections Committee; the ability to freely register opposition parties; and a blueprint for 
new, fair elections at an unspecified point in the future.”237 Thus, under these claims, the 
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New Decembrists sparked a series of massive protests against the corruption of the political 
process, and for liberty thereof.  
In the aftermath of the Snow Revolution, Krasilshchik’s Meduza has remained 
consistent with its initial identities against Putin’s corruption, while Dzyadko’s Arzamas 
has adjusted its claims slightly. According to Idov, Dzyadko’s project works under the 
claim that politicians and the Kremlin have wrongly manipulated Russia’s history to 
provide a source of power or wrongful justification of actions.238 To combat this accused 
wrongdoing, Arzamas stresses free provision of courses on Russia’s cultural and political 
history to all. Meanwhile, Udaltsov and his Left Front have identified under the desire for 
the combination of democracy with socialist and communist-like elements to the social and 
economic sectors of society, and the claims that the Russian government has mistreated its 
people as a whole.239 
2. Resources 
In terms of resources, the New Decembrists relied heavily on free access to the 
internet. Specifically, leaders of the movement utilized social media platforms to both 
personally invite friends and to leave scheduled events open to the public’s intrigue.240 
This resource brought in a specific crowd--the youth population—which would 
furthermore serve as an additional resource to the movement: 
The Internet, by 2011, remained wholly uncensored… As a result, sites like 
LiveJournal and, later, Facebook and its homegrown cousin, VKontakte, 
gradually began to function less as social networks in the Western sense 
than as alternative mass media for a whole new class growing up right under 
the government’s nose: those who barely remembered the Soviet Union at 
all.241  
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Like the movement’s leaders, many of those attracted to the protests were also of 
the younger population in Russia. The New Decembrist’s turn to social media for mass 
gatherings allowed the events to spread quickly and to attract the portion of the Russian 
people who had no fear of a return to the chaos of the 1990s, and were ready to move in 
the name of democracy. These social media sites also served to quickly share video 
evidence of voting fraud, an issue that also brought in the benefits of the modern camera 
cellphone as an important resource.242 
The internet and social media still prove imperative as a resource for the leaders’ 
extended efforts today. Krasilshchik’s Meduza relies on the free use of the internet to report 
news to the masses, as, “Millions of young Russians are abandoning television news for 
the internet, and more often than not on their mobile phones.”243 Dzyadko’s Arzamas 
perhaps relies most directly on the free use of the internet, as the project almost solely 
produces material via podcasts, videos, social media, and several other accessible internet 
media.244 Other resources for this project include funding from socialite Anastasia 
Chukhrai and financial partnerships with the likes of the Tretyakov Gallery and Russian 
search engine Yandex.245 Udaltsov’s movement, meanwhile, relies heavily on its network 
of opposition groups and freedom of speech to continually rally people in motivated 
protest.246 As Udaltsov is quoted as having said,  Only a public response and large protests 
can make the authorities ease the repressions.”247 This group relies heavily on its ability to 
upkeep the very communication that the Kremlin has labeled a threat to political stability. 
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3. Organization and Membership  
For the Snow Revolution and the three specific New Decembrists under analysis, 
organization and membership is straightforward in that it is volunteer based. Participants 
of the Snow Revolution were not required to belong to any group, and leaders of the Snow 
Revolution simply tended to be a few connected journalists. Readers of Meduza are free to 
read or skip over the views of the magazine, and the organization of the group is that of an 
officially established place of news media business rather than a social movement, with 
journalists and editors involved. Dzyadko works alongside highly-respected academics on 
Arzamas, and he aims to attract anyone who might have lost touch with their knowledge 
of history.248 Udaltsov’s Left Front operates with press secretaries, regional branch 
managers, social media specialists, and other positions typical of an NGO or social 
movement, with Udaltsov as the primary leading figure.249 Membership is free and only 
requires answers to a brief questionnaire.250 
4. Mobilization Capabilities  
The mobilization capabilities of the New Decembrists marked a historical point in 
Russian social movement history. As firsthand revolution witness Michael Idov wrote, 
between 60,000 and 100,000 participants, “‘Bolotnaya,’ as the December 10 rally was 
already known, was by an order of magnitude the largest public demonstration Russia’s 
capital had seen in more than a decade.”251 Although the protests that followed in the 
succeeding months were smaller in scale, they continued to surface periodically until May 
of 2012, when stricter laws on protests were put into place.252 Mobilization of Krasilshchik 
and Dzyadko followings cannot truly be measured, as they two have settled into journalism 
rather than contentious activism in the form of protests. It should be noted, though, that as 
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of 2015, “The monthly readership of Meduza exceeded 3.5 million unique visitors, with 
320,000 app downloads and more than 500,000 followers on social media.”253 And, with 
regard to Dzyadko’s Arzamas, as of July 2018, “About 1 million people [were] subscribed 
to their pages on social media and they have averaged around 4 million monthly views.”254 
Although this does not technically qualify as mobilization, as people are not gathering in 
protest, these numbers show potential relevance of these prior revolutionaries’ works on 
Russian opposition culture still today. Meanwhile, mobilization of Udaltsov’s following 
and the Left Front can be seen in quasi-regular protests since Bolotnaya that have 
sometimes involved hundreds of participants.255 Many of these participants are also 
aligned with other leftist organizations to which Udaltsov and the Left Front have 
established close ties.256 Such networking has proven essential to the survival of his 
movement thus far.  
D. ALEXEI NAVALNY’S ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT  
As a leader of one of the most expansive opposition campaigns of 21st century 
Russia, the name Alexei Navalny began to make its way around in 2007 when the anti-
Putin lawyer started a blog aimed at exposing corruption within the Kremlin.257 Perhaps 
Putin’s most sincere threat in the anti-corruption campaign, Navalny has organized, led, 
and inspired tens of street protests, large and small.258 The primary concern of both 
Navalny and his following is the intense corruption that exists within Putin’s regime. To 
combat this element of the Russian government, he founded the Anti-Corruption 
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Foundation in 2011, helped to lead the opposition in the Snow Revolution, accepted 
election to chairholder of the Progress Party in 2013, planned to run against Putin in the 
2018 elections, and has gained enough of a following to provide threat to Putin’s reelection 
campaign.259 Navalny has been dubbed, “Russia’s Last Opposition Hero,” and “The Man 
Putin Fears Most.”260  
As a major competitor to Putin and his regime, Navalny and his following have 
faced countless challenges in terms of government restrictions. Navalny himself has been 
arrested multiple times, only to return promptly to his anti-Putin-themed passion of rallying 
the people against regime corruption.261 Perhaps the most significant challenges have been 
the government’s constant evolution of legislation to prevent Navalny from campaigning 
for presidency or organize his protests to take place in any form, as well as constant denial 
of official registration of his progress party by the Ministry of Justice.262 By denying 
official registration, the party was unable to support or participate officially in the political 
campaign for presidential office, according to legislation.263 Thus, with Navalny, his 
following, and his party posing a potential threat to the Putin regime (and, therefore, the 
soft-authoritarian Russian regime), such preventative action could minimize this threat of 
the opposition.264 The government furthermore relied on legislation that required the 
independent candidate to acquire 300,000 signatures from around the country, but failed to 
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predict Navalny’s creative determination to pursue this requirement.265 Additionally, as 
Parkhomenko wrote, “By early June [of 2017], the number of campaign offices had reached 
sixty. And each visit of Alexei Navalny with his team to a city becomes the main event of 
that city’s life.”266 In the process of acquiring the signatures, Navalny only expanded his 
geographic influence in the opposition movement. All the while, he continued the endeavor 
to register the Progress Party. On May 19, 2018, after six failed attempts to register the 
Progress Party, Navalny elected to start a new party under a different title: Russia of the 
Future.267 This party, although similar to the Progress Party in its anti-corruption identity 
and even a nearly identical logo, is differentiated in that its goal is, “Real changes, real 
reforms.”268 Navalny’s followership has battled through numerous unexpected limitations. 
Regardless of erected roadblocks on the path toward effecting oppositional change, though, 
his followership has hopped on board with his new party’s stated motivation to enact “real 
change,” which suggests it has no plans to back out of the political scene. Like the Progress 
Party, however, the Ministry of Justice suspiciously denied official registration of this new 
party’s name in May of 2019.269 The Ministry claimed that the name had already been 
taken by “Party of Free Citizens,” which reported no name changes.270 
1. Collective Identity and Claims  
The identity Navalny’s following is mainly sourced at the basis of democracy, with 
anti-corruption and a decentralized government at its core. His anti-corruption foundation 
operates under the identity of its namesake: anti-corruption within the government. And, 
according to journalist Sergey Parkhomenko, “Navalny’s supporters conduct their street 
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protests under the same anticorruption slogans he uses in his investigations.”271 To 
continue the example of cohesion within his followership, Sputnik News noted that his 
party platform offers, “Reform [of] Russia’s judiciary and law enforcements,” and the 
home page of the party’s website furthermore claims, “Russia needs strong state 
institutions: the parliament, an independent court, local government, the media, public 
control. The executive and legislative branches should clearly carry out their functions and 
regularly take turns with the help of fair elections.”272 Essentially suggesting the need for 
a system of checks and balances, as well as the removal of corruption and flaw in the courts 
and police force, all of these realms of Navalny’s brand of opposition prescribe to the 
broader concept of free and fair democracy.  
In addition to that of general corruption, further claim to action under Navalny’s 
inspiration and leadership is that of embezzlement by leading government officials. 
Medvedev has especially been under accusation of such actions: “In a video that has been 
viewed nearly 13 million times, Navalny accuses Medvedev of owning land, mansions, 
and luxury yachts from wealth accrued through questionable political deals and state 
loans.”273 With work such as this, Navalny has expanded claims of corruption to include 
embezzlement, therefore adding the claim of an additional layer of fraudulent governance 
under Putin’s regime. The collective aforementioned ideologies are those which his 
movements identify under. Navalny also symbolizes these values himself through his 
various accounts of protest against the regime, therefore representing a culture of freedom, 
democracy, and change.274 Navalny has united the followers of his several political 
endeavors (anti-corruption foundation, progress party, campaign supporters, etc.) under his 
crafted themes of anticorruption and democracy. 
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For Navalny’s following, private donations and social media have provided the 
resources necessary for mobilization. Private donations have maintained the Progress Party 
and Anti-Corruption Foundation, along with the rest of Navalny’s endeavors.275 Navalny 
admitted that the funding for his work has been largely sourced from the efforts of his Fifth 
Season of the Year foundation, which he has used to, “Collect donations that finance 
campaign materials, among other weapons in his drive against corruption and the workings 
of the Kremlin under President Vladimir V. Putin.”276 These donations, which came come 
from the average Russian citizen, amounted to nearly $4.9 million over the course of 2017 
alone.277 In December of 2017, though, officials banned Navalny from candidacy, which 
Navalny responded to by calling on his followers to boycott the entire election.278 As a 
result, Putin called for investigation of the Fifth Season of the Year foundation, which led 
to its disbandment and greater difficulty in financial resourcing for Navalny’s work.279 
The movement’s activity in social media has furthermore aided in the mobilization of 
people for Navalny and against the regime. Although access to news media has been slight, 
the group has turned to the freedom offered through social media sites like Facebook, 
Twitter, and especially YouTube. These platforms have allowed Navalny to appeal to a 
broad population with accessible, easily ingested posts, tweets, videos, or even blogs that 
detail claims against government corruption and calls for action.280  
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3. Organization and Membership  
As a whole, Navalny’s followership operates primarily under his leadership. He has 
accomplished this via maintaining a personal and visible role in social media platforms, 
street demonstrations, his foundations, and his parties. His Progress Party operated under 
Navalny as the chairman, and eight others as elected members of the central council.281 
His election campaign was headed by Leonid Volkov, along with other varying 
departmental leaders such as a fund’s executive director.282 However, the rest of his 
endeavors appear to operate in a horizontal manner under Navalny. His new party, Russia 
of the Future, is headed by Navalny and shows no sign of other leadership. The Anti-
Corruption Foundation, with Navalny as founder and leader, includes a staff of, “30 people, 
who research and investigate cases of corruption.”283 And his social media platforms, 
naturally, operate under the thumb of Navalny himself. As the head of the opposition forces 
to the Putin regime, Navalny must remain a tough, present, and accessible leader to 
politicians and his followers alike.284 Navalny has provided the leading figure for 
numerous organizations and demonstrations, and has emphasized the efforts of his 
movements rather than the political potential of climbing any hierarchical ladder within his 
movements. 
The attainment of membership or followership is largely on a volunteer basis. 
Membership within the Anti-Corruption foundation appears to be more similar to the 
application to and maintenance of a job, while that of the Progress Party can be attained 
via an online application with no evidence of mandatory membership fees.285 His 
campaigns operate on a volunteer basis, as well as followers of his social media and 
participants in his protests. Volunteer-ship is the underlining theme to the life of a follower 
of Alexei Navalny, with no evident costs or long-term required ties.  
                                                 
281 “Party,” Progress Party, https://partyprogress.org/party/#ashurkov.  
282 Parkhomenko, “What is the Point of Navalny’s Pointless Election?”  
283 Anti-Corruption Foundation, “About Us.” 
284 Parkhomenko, “What is the Point of Navalny’s Pointless Election?”  
285 Anti-Corruption Foundation, “About Us.” 
73 
4. Mobilization Capabilities 
When evaluating mobilization and capacity thereof regarding Navalny’s 
movements, analysis should consider numbers involved in demonstrations, as well as 
voting results in his mayoral elections. To begin with analysis of mobilization in 
participation numbers, Parkhomenko noted that, although Navalny mobilized 25 to 30 
thousand people in March 2017 and 100 thousand people in June, his ability to mobilize 
masses relative to Russia’s 140 million citizens is still in question.286 At the dissolution of 
his Progress Party in 2018, the party held 100,000 members.287 Attaining membership to 
the group was simple and anti-elitist. Potential new members were only required to submit 
a questionnaire and an application.288 Especially since Navalny detached from the party, 
the Progress Party has not organized protests, Navalny and his Anti-Corruption Foundation 
have done so, effectively expanding and continuing opportunity for his followership. 
Among these protests have been those involved with the anti-corruption demonstrations in 
2017–2018, a nationwide boycott against voting in the 2018 presidential elections, and 
numerous non-government sanctioned outdoor rallies over the years, among others.289 
These groups, as well as his social media following, have networked fluidly among one 
another.290 His social media outreached has furthermore managed to attract Russia’s youth 
(to include teenagers).291 The networking among these portions of his movement have 
provided a broad support base for Navalny, as well as greater potential for growth as his 
outreach impacts varying factions of people within Russian society. 
Regarding Navalny’s mobilization via his pursuit of political office, he gained his 
following came in an unexpected manner. In 2013, Navalny ran for mayor of Moscow 
without Kremlin funding or support, unlike his opponent, who was also incumbent 
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mayor.292 As Parkhomenko noted, “At the beginning of the mayoral campaign, by 
contrast, Navalny had a handful of volunteer supporters and negligible financing compared 
to his rival. Nonetheless, he managed to collect nearly a third of the votes, which put him 
in the second place.”293 In this case, although he lost the election, Navalny still mobilized 
a third of Moscow’s vote for mayor, which proved the assumptions of his total loss wrong 
and the potentiality for his spreading civilian support a reality.294 As a result of this 
political endeavor, Parkhomenko wrote, “The campaign itself could help a human 
ecosystem coalesce around a leader, an ecosystem that was capable of maintaining and 
enhancing his popularity. It also became clear that a campaign creates an organizational 
structure that doesn’t disappear after the votes have been counted.”295 And, as noted in the 
introduction sections to Navalny’s movements above, Navalny’s efforts in the 2018 
elections furthermore expanded his geographical reach within Russia.296 Even with the 
technical loss of the mayoral elections and his ultimately denied candidacy in the 2018 
presidential elections, Navalny’s movement only expanded as a whole.  
E. CONCLUSION 
After evaluation of the potential durability of the preceding movements based on 
measurements set forth by social movement theory, it is clear that the answer is not 
immediately predictable in all cases. Oborona, although promising in its initial founding, 
failed to create an environment of genuine inclusivity with a solid collective identity that 
would also prove beneficial in networking relationships. It also failed to maintain 
significant mobilization of participants with time and change of leadership, which led to 
the demise of the movement. The New Decembrists, while still active in the opposition 
movement, have also failed to consistently mobilize a powerful force of people and have 
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been met with careful legislative containment by the Putin regime. Navalny and his 
following have maintained consistent activity in contentious politics under a unified 
identity against the general corruption of the Putin regime. But, like the other actors, this 
movement has shown no evidence of significant and growing mobilization numbers. Still, 
the New Decembrists and Navalny have not backed out of the opposition arena. Both 
movements have shown potential to maintain existence despite difficulties set forth by the 
Putin regime. However, the meaningful impact of such endurance is in doubt if it applies 
to no more than a small fraction of Russian society.  
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
This thesis analyzes the potential durability of opposition movements in Putin’s 
Russia. To evaluate the opposition’s durability, this thesis has applied the most recent 
literature on social movement theory to the Russian context..297 The following 
characteristics have been established as essential to the durability of a social movement: 
collective identity and claims, resources, organization and membership, and 
mobilization.298 According to SMT, with strength and consistency in these areas, a 
movement has the potential to prove durable within contentious politics.299 This thesis set 
out to use SMT to determine the durability of Russian social movements before and after 
the Snow Revolution, with the finding that Russian groups have historically failed to 
mobilize enough of the public to apply pressure on the government to effect change, and 
are therefore not likely to be durable.300 
Beginning with analysis of contentious politics in the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras, 
this thesis established that the progression of the opposition movement from late Soviet-
era to present day has been rather cyclical in nature. In the mid-1980s, under Gorbachev’s 
perestroika period, groups and demonstrations began to surface and exist with less 
government backlash than in the pre-Gorbachev period, although they were still illegal.301 
Their illegality is what led to their development as social movements rather than as 
professional organizations or NGOs.302 Gorbachev provided his people the liberties to 
assemble and speak that previously did not exist; as a result, many demonstrations and 
movements arose, some of which (like the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers) formed into 
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social movements.303 Overall, contentious political activity spiked briefly with the 
liberalization of Gorbachev’s perestroika period 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, however, the eruption of activity in 
contentious politics slowed drastically with Yeltsin’s shaky economy.304 Hope and 
opportunity for civic political activity remained high after Poland’s Solidarity, Hungary’s 
Danube Circle protests, and demonstrations in Germany and Czechoslovakia all occurred 
surrounding the disintegration of communism in their respective nations in the 1980s.305 
Yeltsin operated under a hands-off style of governance regarding social movements and 
contentious politics, which provided possibility for movement growth. However, the poor 
economy and resulting lack of available resources (funding, people, time, etc.) led to 
widespread apathy.306 The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers was one of few movements 
that flourished at this time; many others, although given the opportunity to expand under 
Yeltsin’s laissez fair attitude, failed to do so.307 
When control over the nation was passed to Putin in 1999, political apathy 
continued among the Russian people, although a rise in contentious politics and social 
movements had potential.308 The early 2000s were notably quiet in the wake of Putin’s 
implementation of soft authoritarianism, his vigilance over social activity in political 
demonstrations, and the rising prominence of the pro-Putin movement that took off with 
regime endorsement and support.309 This time was also quiet as a result of the unspoken 
social contract that involved improving economic wellbeing by the government in 
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exchange for a cooperative and compliant public.310 Some issue-based social movements 
surfaced especially around the mid to late 2000s, such as the welfare protests and pensioner 
protests and Dissenter’s March. These failed to expand after some amount of resolution 
was established for their claims.311 Instead, they quieted back down to neutral. The CSM, 
however, was again one of the movements that evolved to maintain political relevance.312 
A few groups with broader claims regarding government corruption as a whole, such as 
“Say No” and Oborona, managed to gain some initial headway. Even Oborona dissolved 
in about five years as it failed to uphold most of SMT’s characteristics of durability.313 
With signs of a revival among the opposition, however, Putin’s response came in the form 
of endorsement of support movements such as Nashi, warnings and bans against many 
protests, and police brutality.314 The 2000s did not present a net rise in activity among 
social movements in Russia, but it did experience an awakening of possibility to 
demonstrate and to act. 
The journalist leaders of the Snow Revolution of 2011 brought a revival to the 
opposition with more protestors on the streets than ever before in the history of the Russian 
Federation. Such demonstrations continued (although on smaller scales) over the course of 
nearly two years.315 However, the government’s ability to quash the movement via police 
enforcement, media control, and legislation quieted the opposition forces yet again. They 
have failed to mobilize in similar numbers since.316 Among the revolutions most 
prominent leaders, New Decembrists Ilya Krasilshchik, Filipp Dzyadko, and Sergei 
Udaltsov are still politically active today in their own ways, although they have since lost 
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ties to one another.317 None of these journalists have maintained mobilization numbers 
significant enough or with clear enough ideologies to effect governmental change beyond 
access to educational opportunities and continued work in journalism and small 
demonstrations.318 The government responded to the Snow Revolution and the New 
Decembrists with police control over protests, political arrests of leaders and participants, 
and new legislation that expanded the definition of foreign agents and political involvement 
among social groups.319 As Gel’man stated, following the Snow Revolution, “…The scope 
of abuse and repression against the opposition (and threats thereof) dramatically 
increased.”320 
Since the Snow Revolution, the government has added numerous barriers to activity 
within Russian social movements, although demonstrations and groups have persisted on 
varying levels. Many of the present-day movements are issue-focused rather than anti-
systemic.321 Unpaid teachers and autoworkers presented the first response to Putin’s 
economic policies, and truckers followed suit in retaliation of a new road tax.322 Pensioner 
protests have resurfaced and protests against the new Internet sovereignty law (part of the 
government’s attempt to control the opposition) emerged.323 Such issue-based 
demonstrations have been met with resolve by the Putin administration, as an outspokenly 
angry population could pose a threat to the regime.324 One long-term movement that has 
remained since the Snow Revolution is that of Alexei Navalny, who emerged during and 
aided in leading the Snow Revolution. He has since mobilized thousands for the 2017–
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2018 anti-corruption protests, among other demonstrations.325 The identity of his 
following is more expansive than most others, as it is concerned with the multi-faceted 
corruption of the Putin regime.326 Navalny, one of Putin’s most legitimate threats, has 
mobilized thousands in the form of protests, independent presidential candidacy signatures, 
and election campaigns.327 Still, like the other demonstrations of opposition, Navalny has 
failed to mobilize enough citizens to generate lasting, impactful change. To complicate 
matters, the government has responded via threats against protest organization and 
involvement, legislation that has banned the involvement of youth in contentious politics, 
continued political arrests, increased difficulty in attaining protest permits, organization of 
pro-government rallies, and false reporting of demonstration numbers to downplay the 
mobilization of the opposition.328 Putin’s ambition to reduce opportunity for threat against 
his regime is evident and has thus far proven effective. Regardless of continued efforts to 
mobilize against issues or general corruption within the regime, the overall mobilization of 
the opposition has yet to overwhelm the repression attempts of the state.  
Over time, the propensity for Russians to protest in opposition to the state has 
wavered alongside the government approval and trust ratings. The Levada Center’s survey 
results regarding whether the individual would be willing to protest are inversely related to 
the approval of Putin.329 According to the surveys, between 1994 and 2017, as public 
approval of Putin decreased, willingness to protest over economic or political demands 
increased, and vice versa.330 
Although the cyclical nature of movements of contentious politics have not resulted 
in net political change in favor of their agendas, Russia’s opposition forces have still 
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demonstrated some strengths on the scale of SMT durability. They have managed to 
mobilize the civilian population in moments of opportunity, evident in events like the 2005 
welfare protests, the 2009 Dissenter’s March, the 2011–2013 Snow Revolution, the 2015 
truckers protests, the 2018 landfill protests, etc.331 The youth of Oborona, the New 
Decembrists of 2011, and the following of Navalny are all evidence of the opposition’s 
continued desire to stand up for (and identify under) democratic principles and to speak 
out against the faults of Putin’s soft-authoritarian government.332 Periodic efforts to 
mobilize the Russian public have shown potential, however, only in small numbers or for 
brief periods of time.  
The weaknesses this thesis has discovered in the opposition are those that have 
stunted its overall capability in Putin’s Russia. The opposition has failed to mobilize large 
numbers in the long term. Oborona dissolved, the New Decembrists are essentially 
estranged from one another, and the Navalny movement has mobilized decent numbers 
over short periods rather than mass numbers over longer timeframes. Another weakness is 
the opposition’s inability to continue to gain momentum through the threats of government 
changes in legislation.333 There furthermore exists an inability to overpower the pro-
government movements that have the financial backing of the state.334 The government 
has both engaged with and shut down contentious politics to its advantage, and the 
opposition has yet to find a successful way to break through such barriers to its expansion.  
The information presented in this thesis has shown an all-around lack of promise 
for the durability of anti-government movements in Russia. After having reviewed the state 
of contentious politics and having applied the measurements of durability set forth by SMT, 
the resilience of the opposition as a whole appears slight. There has been and will likely 
continue to exist a certain set of people who are opposed to the actions of the state, but this 
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is a small part of society. The relatively small mobilization that has presented itself thus 
far has used windows of opportunity to call for Putin to step down or reform his government 
in favor of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, honest and fair elections and other 
basic democratic principles.335 However, these requests have yet to bet met and the 
movements that call for these requests show no sign of expansion.336 While these 
movements work to bolster up larger numbers, the Putin regime has demonstrated great 
skill in combatting the opposition, meanwhile also isolating the average Russian from 
awareness of protests.337 The regime has recently passed legislation to disconnect Russians 
from the world wide web (a massively important resource to the mobilization success of 
the Snow Revolution) among other freedom-encroaching legislation. Ability to mobilize 
massively and freely is continually stifled.338 With the government’s thus far successful 
campaign to suppress anti-government movements and mobilization numbers too minimal 
to generate a necessity for genuine change, hope for the resilience of Russia’s opposition 
force is nominal at present. The most promising mobilization opportunity for opposition 
movements appears to require a massive violation of the promise of economic wellbeing 
on Putin’s part. If the opposition is to successfully pressure the Putin regime to exchange 
soft-authoritarianism for the freedoms of democracy, it would need to mobilize mass 
numbers over a sustained period of time. Unless that opportunity arises and the opposition 
seizes that moment, the resilience of the Russian opposition to Putin’s regime appears ill-
fated.  
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